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This	  research	  provides	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  North	  Island	  freight	  
infrastructure,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  (POAL).	  	  
This	  research	  is	  important	  to	  New	  Zealand,	  especially	  having	  experienced	  the	  
Canterbury	  earthquake	  disaster	  in	  2010/2011	  and	  the	  current	  2012	  industrial	  action	  
plaguing	  the	  POAL.	  New	  Zealand	  is	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  manufactured	  
high	  value	  goods,	  commodity	  products	  and	  raw	  materials.	  New	  Zealand’s	  main	  
challenge	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  of	  its	  geographical	  distances	  to	  major	  markets.	  Currently	  New	  
Zealand	  handles	  approximately	  2	  million	  containers	  per	  annum,	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  
~40%	  of	  those	  containers	  being	  shipped	  through	  POAL.	  
It	  needs	  to	  be	  highlighted	  that	  POAL	  is	  classified	  as	  an	  import	  port	  in	  comparison	  to	  
Port	  of	  Tauranga	  (POT)	  that	  has	  traditionally	  had	  an	  export	  focus.	  This	  last	  fact	  is	  of	  
great	  importance,	  as	  in	  a	  case	  of	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  POAL,	  any	  import	  consigned	  to	  the	  
Auckland	  and	  northern	  region	  will	  need	  to	  be	  redirected	  through	  POT	  in	  a	  quick	  and	  
efficient	  way	  to	  reach	  Auckland	  and	  the	  northern	  regions.	  This	  may	  mean	  a	  major	  
impact	  on	  existing	  infrastructure	  and	  supply	  chain	  systems	  that	  are	  currently	  in	  place.	  	  
This	  study	  is	  critical	  as	  an	  element	  of	  risk	  management,	  looking	  at	  how	  to	  mitigate	  the	  
risk	  to	  the	  greater	  Auckland	  region.	  With	  the	  new	  Super	  City	  taking	  hold,	  the	  POAL	  is	  a	  
fundamental	  link	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  to	  the	  largest	  metropolitan	  area	  within	  New	  
Zealand.	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  Tauranga	  
g	   	   Gram	  
GDP	   	   Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  
ha	   	   Hectare	  
HPV	   	   High	  Performance	  Vehicle	  (NZTA)	  
hr	   	   Hour	  
hrs	   	   Hours	  
JIT	   	   Just	  in	  Time	  
JOG	   Waikato	  Regional	  Council	  Grant	  of	  Funding	  to	  KiwiRail	  to	  upgrade	  network	  to	  
attract	  more	  regional	  volume	  onto	  rail.	  ($13mil	  grant)	  
kg	   	   Kilogram	  
km	   	   Kilometres	  
LE	   	   Locomotive	  Engineer	  
MAF	   	   Ministry	  of	  Agriculture	  and	  Forestry	  
mil	   	   Millions	  	  
MoT	   	   Ministry	  of	  Transport	  
NCR	   	   Net	  Crane	  Rate	  
NLTP	   	   National	  Land	  Transport	  Programmes	  
NZTA	   	   New	  Zealand	  Transport	  Agency	  
OKA	   	   Out	  of	  Kilter	  Algorithm	  
POAL	   	   Ports	  of	  Auckland	  
POT	   	   Port	  of	  Tauranga	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SH	   	   State	  Highway	  1	  or	  2	  or	  27	  or	  29	  as	  depicted	  by	  the	  numeral	  following	  the	  SH	  
STATS	  NZ	   Statistics	  New	  Zealand	  
T	  /	  t	   	   Tonnes	  
TEU≈	   	   Twenty	  Foot	  Equivalent	  unit,	  twenty	  foot	  container,	  Container,	  slot	  
TRG	   	   Tauranga	  
Note:	  where	  the	  word	  container	  is	  used	  in	  this	  document,	  it	  is	  specifically	  referring	  to	  Twenty	  
Foot	  Equivalent	  Units	  or	  TEU≈	  as	  reported,	  recorded	  and	  accounted	  for	  by	  all	  NZ	  Ports	  when	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1. INTRODUCTION	  
1.1. Setting	  the	  Scene	  
New	  Zealand	  is	  a	  country	  made	  up	  of	  two	  main	  islands,	  which	  accommodate	  the	  main	  
population	  and	  are	  the	  source	  of	  the	  country’s	  gross	  domestic	  product.	  New	  Zealand	  is	  
heavily	  reliant	  on	  efficient	  transport	  of	  commodities	  to	  allow	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  
country	  to	  prosper.	  Sea	  freight	  accounted	  for	  99.6%	  of	  trade	  volume	  in	  2008	  (NZ	  
Shippers	  council,	  2010).	  
New	  Zealand’s	  North	  Island	  accounts	  for	  72%	  of	  all	  containerised	  imports	  and	  exports	  
to	  and	  from	  New	  Zealand,	  which	  is	  some	  2,353,067	  TEU	  (Twenty-­‐foot	  equivalent	  
units/containers).	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  account	  for	  81%	  of	  the	  
North	  Island	  container	  traffic	  or	  some	  1,378,711	  TEU.	  [See	  Appendix	  7.1	  for	  North	  
Island	  Map	  detailing	  container	  exports	  by	  port	  and	  Appendix	  7.2	  for	  South	  Island	  Map	  
detailing	  container	  exports	  by	  port].	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  containerised	  imports	  (70%)	  come	  through	  Ports	  of	  
Auckland	  (POAL)	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  containerised	  exports	  (39%)	  exit	  
the	  North	  Island	  through	  the	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  (POT).	  	  
TABLE	  1	  -­‐	  Summary	  of	  POAL	  &	  POT	  Container	  Volume	  for	  2010.	  (POAL,	  2010)	  
	  
It	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  both	  POAL	  and	  POT	  are	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  
North	  Island	  logistics	  infrastructure	  and	  any	  disruption	  at	  either	  port	  would	  have	  a	  
fundamental	  impact	  on	  the	  country’s	  economy.	  
New	  Zealand	  is	  home	  to	  some	  65	  volcanoes	  in	  various	  stages	  of	  their	  life	  ranging	  from	  
active,	  to	  dormant,	  to	  extinct.	  We	  make	  up	  part	  of	  the	  Pacific	  Ring	  of	  Fire,	  which	  is	  
some	  44,000km	  in	  length	  and	  has	  a	  total	  of	  452	  volcanoes.	  New	  Zealand	  exists	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  Pacific	  Tectonic	  plate	  being	  subducted	  (going	  underneath)	  the	  Indo-­‐
Australian	  tectonic	  plate.	  We	  sit	  on	  the	  boarder	  between	  these	  two	  wrestling	  giants	  
(GeoNet,	  2011).	  
“A	  volcanic	  field	  that	  covers	  around	  360km2	  under	  Auckland	  City	  includes	  49	  separate	  
volcanoes,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  considered	  extinct.	  However,	  the	  field	  as	  a	  whole	  remains	  
active.	  The	  last	  eruption	  was	  Rangitoto,	  around	  600	  years	  ago”	  (GeoNet,	  2011).	  
Multiple	  natural	  disasters	  experienced	  globally	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years	  impacted	  on	  
logistics	  and	  freight	  distribution	  in	  general,	  such	  as	  volcanic	  activity	  in	  the	  northern	  
and	  southern	  hemisphere	  with	  ash	  clouds	  circulating	  over	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  
Type All'of'NZ North'Island POAL'/'POT as'%'of'NZ'Total as'%'of'N/Island
Total 2,353,067 1,700,225 1,378,711 59% 81%
Full'Imports 553,532 430,972 373,059 67% 87%
Full'Exports 795,488 561,673 427,491 54% 76%
Empty'Imports 437,416 278,201 179,971 41% 65%
Empty'Exports 185,069 140,258 119,519 65% 85%
Other 381,562 289,121 278,671 73% 96%
Summary'of'NZ,'N/Island,'&'POAL'/'POT'Container'volume'for'2010'in'TEU≈
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Kingdom	  in	  the	  northern	  hemisphere	  and	  ash	  clouds	  circulating	  over	  Australia,	  New	  
Zealand,	  Southern	  Africa	  and	  South	  America	  in	  the	  southern	  hemisphere.	  This	  
phenomenon	  resulted	  in	  millions	  of	  passengers	  being	  stranded	  and	  billions	  of	  dollars	  
of	  lost	  revenue	  to	  the	  global	  logistics	  industry.	  In	  Europe	  alone	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  
cost	  to	  industry	  is	  up	  to	  €2.5bn	  and	  still	  counting	  (Sabbatt,	  2010).	  
The	  recent	  earthquakes	  in	  Christchurch	  New	  Zealand	  in	  2010	  and	  2011	  and	  Tōhoku	  
Japan	  in	  2011	  resulted	  in	  loss	  of	  life,	  property	  destruction,	  infrastructure	  failure	  and	  
massive	  disruption	  to	  logistics	  networks.	  The	  loss	  of	  life	  is	  still	  being	  quantified,	  as	  is	  
the	  total	  cost	  of	  these	  natural	  disasters.	  The	  current	  estimates	  run	  into	  the	  hundred	  of	  
billions.	  
With	  these	  phenomena	  current	  and	  exposing	  the	  fragility	  of	  existing	  logistics	  
infrastructure,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  investigation	  is	  to	  test	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  North	  
Island	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  prolonged	  disruption	  of	  the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster.	  
1.2. Aim	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  investigation	  is	  to	  test	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  North	  Island	  
Infrastructure	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  whole	  infrastructure,	  including	  rail,	  is	  
robust	  enough	  to	  cope	  with	  a	  major	  shift	  of	  import	  and	  export	  volume	  at	  short	  or	  little	  
notice.	  
1.3. Objectives	  
The	  research	  will	  identify	  and	  discuss	  the	  existing	  infrastructure	  in	  place	  –	  available	  
modes	  associated	  with	  capacities	  and	  constraints	  along	  the	  supply	  chain	  –	  and	  to	  
identify	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  mitigate	  this	  risk	  through	  instituting	  load	  and	  
discharge	  port	  changes	  requiring	  the	  redirection	  of	  marine	  vessels.	  	  
In	  particular	  this	  study	  will	  focus	  on:	  
• Similar	  analyses/studies	  that	  have	  been	  conducted	  in	  New	  Zealand	  or	  
internationally.	  
• Identifying	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  POAL,	  POT,	  the	  feeder	  systems	  to/from	  these	  ports,	  
e.g.	  road	  and	  rail.	  
• Assessing	  pressure	  points	  and	  analysing	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  fragility.	  
• Mitigation	  of	  pressure	  points	  by	  looking	  at	  various	  mode	  alternatives	  such	  as	  ports,	  
road	  and	  rail.	  
• Testing	  whether	  the	  Out	  of	  Kilter	  Algorithm	  (OKA)	  modelling	  is	  appropriate	  and	  can	  
be	  applied	  in	  this	  instance.	  
• Identifying	  whether/how	  hurdles	  such	  as	  economical,	  technical,	  geographical,	  
human	  resource	  and	  environmental	  can	  be	  overcome.	  	  
• Efficiencies,	  timing	  of	  product	  delivery.	  
• Whether	  Just	  in	  Time	  (JIT)	  is	  still	  justified	  under	  resilience	  conditions.	  	  
1.4. Methodology	  
This	  research	  was	  conducted	  using	  the	  following	  process:	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• Literature	  review	  of	  international	  case	  studies	  
• Compilation	  of	  data	  supplied	  by	  POAL/POT	  to	  the	  supply	  chain	  of	  vessels	  to/from	  
the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Tauranga.	  
o Shipping	  schedules	  
o Port	  data	  on	  infrastructure	  availability,	  berth	  occupancy,	  crane	  availability	  
and	  productivity	  
o Container	  movements	  –	  imports/exports	  
o Capacities	  available	  and	  saturation	  points	  
• Evaluation	  of	  the	  above	  data	  and	  assessment	  of	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  in	  
terms	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  operations	  to	  make	  it	  happen.	  
• Assessing	  whether	  a	  simulation	  model	  such	  as	  the	  OKA	  model	  is	  relevant	  and	  able	  
to	  test	  a	  variety	  of	  scenarios.	  	  	  
• Identifying	  whether	  potential	  relocation	  of	  vessels	  planned	  to	  call	  POAL	  will	  be	  able	  
to	  be	  diverted	  to	  POT,	  and	  under	  which	  conditions	  this	  can	  take	  place.	  
Some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  to	  be	  examined	  will	  be	  for	  example	  volumes,	  number	  of	  
containers	  (total	  containers,	  full	  imports,	  full	  exports,	  empty	  imports,	  empty	  exports,	  
other),	  immediate	  available	  capacity	  associated	  to	  various	  modes,	  infrastructural	  
inhibitors	  and	  how	  these	  could	  be	  addressed,	  fixed	  asset	  capabilities	  and	  limitations	  of	  
all	  sorts.	  
1.5. Scope	  and	  Limitations	  
Scope	  of	  the	  investigation:	  
• The	  scope	  of	  the	  investigation	  is	  limited	  to	  container	  trade,	  specifically	  the	  current	  
volumes	  that	  are	  imported	  and	  exported	  through	  Auckland	  and	  Tauranga.	  	  
• Containers	  that	  were	  imported	  and	  exported	  through	  the	  two	  respective	  ports	  
during	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010	  will	  be	  used	  to	  perform	  modelling	  to	  determine	  
impact	  on	  infrastructure.	  The	  reason	  for	  using	  volumes	  during	  August	  as	  opposed	  
to	  any	  other	  month	  is	  that	  both	  Ports	  would	  be	  experiencing	  “normal”	  volume	  
trade	  during	  this	  window,	  as	  this	  would	  be	  the	  tail	  end	  of	  the	  NZ	  export	  peak	  and	  
the	  beginning	  of	  the	  NZ	  import	  peak.	  Both	  Ports,	  as	  being	  the	  most	  “sensible	  time”	  
to	  model	  average	  numbers,	  agreed	  to	  this	  date.	  
Limitations	  of	  the	  investigation:	  
• It	  is	  assumed	  that	  both	  of	  the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  (Manakau	  and	  Waitamata)	  are	  
totally	  inoperable	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  exercise,	  effectively	  ruling	  out	  the	  option	  
of	  coastal	  shipping	  into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  POAL	  during	  this	  outage.	  
• Road,	  rail	  and	  supporting	  infrastructures	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  modelled	  
solution.	  
• Modelling	  will	  be	  done	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  by	  spread	  sheeting	  and	  with	  the	  
consideration	  of	  using	  an	  OKA	  Model.	  (Latest	  OKA	  update	  by	  Emeritus	  Professor	  
for	  Transport,	  Kissling,	  Lincoln	  University,	  2009).	  The	  OKA	  to	  be	  used	  was	  
developed	  by	  Fulkerson	  in	  1961.	  The	  out	  of	  kilter	  algorithm	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  
primal-­‐dual	  algorithm	  (Fulkerson,	  1961).	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1.6. Structure	  of	  Report	  
The	  first	  chapter	  concentrates	  on	  setting	  the	  scene,	  including	  identifying	  the	  objectives,	  
outlining	  the	  methodology	  used	  and	  defining	  the	  scope	  and	  limitations	  of	  this	  report.	  	  
Next	  the	  Golden	  Triangle	  infrastructure	  and	  network	  reliability	  are	  discussed	  by	  
investigating	  Ports,	  Road	  and	  Rail	  networks.	  
Chapter	  three	  is	  dedicated	  to	  International	  case	  studies	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  
natural	  disasters	  on	  Ports	  situated	  in	  Chile,	  Japan	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  
This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  case	  study	  considering	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  North	  Island	  freight	  
infrastructure	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland.	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2. OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  GOLDEN	  TRIANGLE	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  	  
AND	  NETWORK	  RELIABILITY	  
	  
2.1. Introduction	  
This	  chapter	  outlines	  information	  on	  reliability	  of	  ports,	  road	  &	  rail	  infrastructure	  and	  
networks	  within	  the	  Golden	  Triangle	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  of	  New	  Zealand.	  
The	  Golden	  Triangle	  is	  an	  economic	  powerhouse	  existing	  between	  the	  three	  cities	  of	  
Auckland,	  Hamilton	  and	  Tauranga,	  which	  produce	  more	  than	  one	  third	  of	  New	  
Zealand’s	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  (GDP)	  (Waikato	  Times,	  2010).	  
Geographically,	  the	  most	  important	  feature	  from	  a	  transport	  perspective	  is	  the	  
arrangement	  of	  New	  Zealand	  as	  two	  elongated	  main	  islands	  separated	  by	  a	  passage	  of	  
water	  (Cook	  Strait).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  layout,	  each	  island	  has	  complete	  and	  self-­‐	  
contained	  road	  and	  rail	  networks,	  linked	  with	  the	  other	  island	  via	  coastal	  shipping	  and	  
inter-­‐island	  road	  and	  rail	  ferries	  to	  form	  a	  national	  network,	  and	  with	  the	  outside	  
world	  through	  gateways	  at	  international	  sea	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  airports.	  
Mountainous	  terrain	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  population	  dictate	  the	  course	  that	  the	  
land	  transport	  networks	  follow	  within	  each	  island	  (Bolland	  et	  al,	  2005).	  
The	  movement	  of	  freight	  plays	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  sustaining	  and	  supporting	  economic	  
development	  and	  thus	  contributes	  to	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  life	  experienced	  in	  New	  
Zealand.	  The	  freight	  sector	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  the	  export	  industry,	  linking	  
areas	  of	  production	  to	  the	  ports	  and	  its	  costs	  contribute	  to	  the	  overall	  costs	  and	  
competitiveness	  of	  New	  Zealand	  goods	  on	  world	  markets.	  An	  efficient	  freight	  industry	  
can	  provide	  cost	  effective	  forms	  of	  transport	  to	  improve	  the	  overall	  competitiveness	  of	  
New	  Zealand	  exports.	  The	  movement	  of	  freight	  influences	  almost	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  
economy	  and	  household	  activities	  and	  any	  loss	  of	  efficiency	  in	  the	  freight	  sector	  can	  
have	  widespread	  impacts	  (Paling	  et	  al,	  2008).	  
Transport	  networks	  are	  the	  fundamental	  critical	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  
people	  and	  goods	  in	  our	  globalised	  network	  economy.	  Transportation	  networks	  also	  
serve	  as	  the	  primary	  conduit	  for	  rescue,	  recovery	  and	  reconstruction	  in	  disasters	  
(Nagurney,	  2011).	  
New	  Zealand	  as	  an	  isolated	  country	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  efficient	  transportation	  across	  
all	  modes	  to	  allow	  the	  economy	  to	  prosper.	  
2.2. Infrastructure	  Networks	  
New	  Zealand’s	  transport	  networks	  are	  the	  lifeline	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  communities	  
and	  are	  vital	  for	  response	  and	  recovery	  of	  the	  country	  and	  its	  economy	  after	  any	  major	  
events	  such	  as	  earthquakes,	  floods	  or	  volcano	  eruptions.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  
fundamental	  that	  our	  networks	  are	  resilient	  and	  that	  vital	  links	  maintain	  some	  form	  of	  
functionality	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster.	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The	  Hawkes	  Bay	  earthquake	  of	  1931	  with	  a	  magnitude	  of	  7.8	  caused	  severe	  and	  
widespread	  damage	  to	  buildings	  and	  the	  roads,	  railway	  line	  and	  Port	  of	  Napier	  
(Brabhaharan,	  2006).	  
The	  damages	  to	  lifelines	  resultant	  from	  this	  earthquake	  are	  documented	  and	  covered	  
off	  in	  detail	  by	  Evans	  (2006).	  	  Evans	  advises	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  key	  networks	  had	  a	  
major	  impact	  on	  the	  response	  and	  recovery	  from	  the	  disaster	  including	  the	  restoration	  
of	  power,	  as	  transformers	  could	  not	  be	  brought	  in	  due	  to	  infrastructure	  failure	  such	  as	  
bridge	  collapse	  and	  massive	  Port	  damage.	  
The	  Christchurch	  earthquakes	  of	  September	  2010	  with	  a	  magnitude	  of	  7.1	  and	  2011	  of	  
6.3	  also	  resulted	  in	  wide	  spread	  damage	  to	  the	  network	  infrastructure,	  however	  basic	  
functionality	  was	  restored	  relatively	  quickly	  to	  the	  road,	  rail	  and	  Port	  infrastructure.	  	  
Some	  examples	  of	  contingency	  plans	  are	  as	  follows:	  
• Fonterra	  rerouted	  export	  stock	  via	  rail	  to	  Timaru	  Port	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  ship,	  
which	  was	  also	  diverted	  to	  Timaru	  Port	  (Rural	  News	  Group,	  2011).	  
• Z	  Energy	  reported	  that	  following	  the	  temporary	  closure	  of	  Port	  of	  Lyttelton	  a	  
shipment	  of	  fuel	  was	  diverted	  to	  Timaru	  Port	  and	  an	  industry	  fleet	  of	  24	  truck	  
tankers	  have	  been	  bridging	  the	  fuel	  into	  Christchurch	  on	  a	  continuous	  basis	  (Hill,	  
2011).	  
From	  the	  above	  two	  examples	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  that	  the	  road	  infrastructure	  into	  
the	  Christchurch	  region	  was	  functional	  enough	  to	  allow	  fuel	  to	  be	  delivered	  by	  tankers	  
and	  the	  rail	  network	  was	  operational	  allowing	  cargo	  to	  be	  rerouted	  from	  Christchurch	  
to	  Timaru.	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  general	  statistics	  on	  the	  “up	  time”	  or	  availability	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  
logistics	  network	  infrastructure	  (roads,	  rail	  and	  ports),	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  comment	  
that	  the	  infrastructure	  is	  relatively	  robust	  and	  available	  for	  business.	  There	  are	  some	  
obvious	  pinch	  points	  within	  the	  North	  Island	  such	  as:	  
• The	  Karangahake	  Gorge,	  which	  is	  traversed	  by	  SH2	  between	  the	  Waikato	  and	  Bay	  
of	  Plenty.	  This	  Gorge	  is	  susceptible	  to	  flooding,	  slips	  and	  black	  ice	  during	  the	  winter	  
months,	  but	  it	  is	  invariably	  only	  closed	  for	  a	  matter	  of	  hours	  per	  event	  or	  remains	  
open	  with	  a	  temporary	  speed	  restriction.	  
• The	  Kaimai	  Mountain	  pass	  on	  SH29	  between	  the	  Waikato	  and	  Bay	  of	  Plenty.	  This	  
mountain	  pass	  is	  susceptible	  to	  road	  accidents,	  which	  force	  closure	  from	  time	  to	  
time,	  and	  occasional	  black	  frost	  during	  severe	  cold	  weather.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  road	  
is	  normally	  only	  closed	  for	  a	  few	  hours	  after	  which	  it	  is	  reopened,	  or	  the	  pass	  
remains	  open	  with	  reduced	  passing	  lanes.	  
• The	  Desert	  Road	  section	  of	  SH1,	  crossing	  over	  a	  high	  mountain	  pass	  between	  
Waiouru	  and	  Turangi	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  North	  Island,	  can	  be	  very	  cold	  and	  wet	  in	  
winter.	  Half	  a	  dozen	  times	  a	  year,	  the	  rain	  turns	  to	  snow	  on	  the	  Desert	  Road	  and	  it	  
becomes	  impassable	  to	  traffic	  (Directions,	  2011).	  In	  such	  cases	  there	  are	  alternate	  
routes	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  complete	  a	  journey.	  
The	  specific	  network	  in	  question,	  namely	  the	  road,	  rail	  and	  port	  infrastructure	  within	  
the	  Golden	  Triangle	  has	  not	  been	  subjected	  to	  a	  natural	  disaster	  of	  such	  a	  nature	  as	  to	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render	  the	  network	  inoperable.	  Flooding	  over	  recent	  years	  has	  damaged	  small	  parts	  of	  
the	  network,	  however	  no	  noticeable	  outage	  occurred	  that	  was	  not	  rectified	  within	  
hours	  of	  the	  event.	  The	  network	  is	  thus	  “untested”	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster.	  
2.3. North	  Island	  Ports	  
2.3.1. 	  	   Overview	  
New	  Zealand’s	  North	  Island	  currently	  has	  six	  ports	  that	  handle	  containers	  from	  an	  
import	  and	  export	  basis.	  They	  are,	  starting	  from	  the	  north	  and	  working	  down	  the	  
eastern	  seaboard,	  North	  Port	  (Marsden	  Point),	  Ports	  of	  Auckland,	  Port	  of	  Tauranga,	  
Port	  of	  Napier,	  Centre	  Port	  (Wellington)	  and	  Port	  of	  Taranaki	  (New	  Plymouth)	  on	  the	  
western	  coast	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  (see	  fig.1).	  Of	  these	  six	  ports,	  Auckland	  and	  Tauranga	  
are	  the	  main	  container	  ports	  servicing	  the	  Auckland,	  Waikato	  and	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  regions	  
–	  	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Golden	  Triangle.	  The	  most	  significant	  port	  in	  terms	  of	  
container	  traffic	  handled	  and	  population	  density	  serviced	  is	  Auckland.	  North	  Port	  is	  
discounted	  out	  of	  the	  equation,	  as	  it	  currently	  has	  no	  dedicated	  container	  handling	  
facilities,	  infrastructure,	  systems	  and	  resources.	  Further	  to	  this	  North	  Port	  has	  no	  rail	  
link	  connection	  to	  the	  main	  north/south	  trunk	  line.	  Port	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Tauranga	  
both	  have	  well-­‐established	  container	  handling	  operations	  supported	  by	  good	  
infrastructure,	  systems	  and	  logistics	  capabilities.	  Between	  the	  two	  ports	  they	  currently	  
handle	  81%	  (Table	  1)	  of	  all	  North	  Island	  container	  traffic.	  Port	  of	  Napier,	  Centre	  Port	  in	  
Wellington	  and	  Port	  of	  Taranaki	  all	  have	  container	  handling	  facilities,	  infrastructure,	  
systems	  and	  resources,	  albeit	  on	  a	  significantly	  smaller	  scale	  than	  Auckland	  and	  
Tauranga.	  These	  three	  ports	  together	  only	  handle	  ~13%	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  imports	  
and	  ~24%	  of	  the	  exports.	  	  
2.3.2. Ports	  of	  Auckland	  (POAL)	  
Ports	  of	  Auckland	  are	  New	  Zealand’s	  largest	  port	  in	  terms	  of	  containers	  throughput.	  
POAL	  handles	  ~51%	  (Table	  1)	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  container	  traffic.	  This	  is	  handled	  
through	  two	  “on	  port”	  container	  terminals	  at	  POAL,	  namely	  Fergusson	  Container	  
Terminal	  covering	  32ha,	  which	  has	  a	  610m	  berth	  and	  is	  serviced	  by	  5	  Post	  Panamax	  
cranes.	  The	  second	  “on	  port”	  container	  terminal	  is	  Bledisloe	  Container	  Terminal	  
covering	  some	  14.5ha,	  which	  has	  a	  260m	  berth	  and	  3	  ship	  to	  shore	  cranes.	  Both	  of	  
these	  container	  terminals	  are	  serviced	  by	  >34	  Straddle	  carriers.	  The	  port	  is	  serviced	  by	  
road	  and	  rail.	  
A	  study	  conducted	  in	  1997	  of	  the	  Rangitoto	  island	  volcano	  forming	  part	  of	  the	  entry	  
channel	  to	  the	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  (see	  fig.2)	  and	  other	  volcanoes	  in	  the	  immediate	  Port	  
vicinity,	  modelled	  up	  to	  5	  different	  scenarios	  resultant	  in	  natural	  disasters.	  The	  
outcome	  of	  the	  study	  and	  scenario	  modelling	  was	  that	  a	  5%	  likelihood	  of	  eruption	  
within	  the	  next	  50	  years	  existed	  and	  that	  this	  would	  block	  the	  shipping	  channel,	  hence	  
the	  need	  to	  plan	  ahead	  (Thull,	  2011).	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FIGURE	  1	  -­‐	  View	  of	  Auckland,	  POAL	  wharves,	  shipping	  channel	  and	  Rangitoto	  volcano	  (POAL,	  2011)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Ports	  of	  Auckland	  opened	  an	  inland	  port	  in	  East	  Tamaki	  February	  2002.	  The	  East	  
Tamaki	  inland	  port	  closed	  in	  2007	  following	  Fisher	  and	  Paykel’s	  decision	  to	  move	  part	  
of	  its	  production	  offshore	  (Ports	  of	  Auckland,	  2008).	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  opened	  an	  
inland	  port	  at	  Wiri	  in	  October	  2005,	  also	  offering	  full	  import	  and	  export	  processing	  and	  
storage	  of	  containers.	  The	  facility	  is	  situated	  on	  15ha	  of	  land	  in	  southern	  Auckland.	  The	  
Wiri	  facility	  has	  good	  road	  links	  and	  is	  linked	  to	  Rail,	  albeit	  only	  with	  a	  link	  on	  the	  
northern	  side,	  making	  south	  bound	  freight	  not	  possible	  without	  incurring	  shunting	  on	  
the	  main	  north/south	  trunk	  line.	  The	  southern	  access	  link	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  established,	  
however	  this	  would	  be	  relatively	  simple	  to	  do,	  but	  has	  to	  date	  not	  been	  required.	  
	  TABLE	  2	  -­‐	  POAL	  Key	  Data	  Sheet	  (POAL	  2010	  &	  2011)	  	  
	  
2.3.3. 	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  (POT)	  
Port	  of	  Tauranga	  is	  New	  Zealand’s	  largest	  port	  by	  total	  tonnage	  imported	  and	  exported,	  
handling	  in	  excess	  of	  ~14	  million	  tonnes	  of	  freight	  (Port	  of	  Tauranga,	  2010).	  POT	  is	  New	  
Zealand’s	  second	  largest	  port	  in	  terms	  of	  container	  throughput	  handling	  ~30%	  (Table	  
1)	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  container	  traffic.	  This	  is	  largely	  handled	  through	  the	  Sulphur	  
Point	  Container	  Terminal	  covering	  some	  39ha	  (with	  another	  33ha	  unsealed	  available).	  
The	  container	  terminal	  has	  a	  600m	  berth	  with	  another	  170m	  currently	  under	  
Terminal Berth, Space,Available ,Throughput,in,TEU Crane,Data Straddles
Name length Current Current Number Water Road Rail
Fergusson 610m 32ha 5,p/pmax 34 ✓ ✓ ✓
Bledisloe 260m 14.5ha 867,368 3,ship/shore ✓ ✓ ✓
Wiri, N/A 15ha 2,x,,reach,Stackers none ✗ ✓ ✓
Logistics,services
POAL%Key%Data%Sheet%
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construction.	  24	  straddle	  carriers	  service	  this	  container	  terminal.	  Sulphur	  point	  is	  
serviced	  by	  a	  robust	  purpose	  built	  road	  infrastructure	  and	  rail.	  
The	  Mt	  Wharves	  falls	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  investigation,	  as	  they	  are	  dedicated	  to	  
handling	  bulk	  and	  break-­‐bulk	  cargo.	  
On	  the	  5th	  June	  1999	  the	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  opened	  New	  Zealand’s	  first	  inland	  port	  in	  
Southdown,	  an	  industrial	  suburb	  in	  the	  south	  of	  Auckland	  city.	  This	  facility	  is	  known	  as	  
MetroPort	  and	  acts	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  main	  Port	  of	  Tauranga,	  located	  some	  200	  
km	  to	  the	  south	  east	  (Port	  of	  Tauranga,	  2009).	  	  MetroPort	  is	  situated	  on	  3.5ha	  of	  land	  
and	  has	  1450	  ground	  slots.	  This	  facility	  has	  good	  road	  and	  rail	  links	  and	  can	  cater	  for	  2	  
x	  110	  TEU≅	  capacity	  trains	  on	  its	  two	  rail	  sidings	  totalling	  780m	  (MetroPort	  Overview,	  
2011).	  
TABLE	  3	  -­‐	  POT	  Key	  Data	  Sheet	  (POT	  2010	  &	  2011)	  
	  
	  
2.3.4. 	  Comparison	  of	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  
Table	  4	  below	  is	  a	  comparative	  between	  POAL	  and	  POT,	  highlighting	  what	  the	  two	  
Ports	  have	  in	  common	  and	  what	  the	  points	  of	  differentiation	  are	  that	  exist	  between	  
the	  two	  Ports.	  
	  
TABLE	  4	  -­‐	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  Comparative	  Fact	  Sheet	  
	  
Terminal Berth, Space,Available ,Throughput,in,TEU Crane,Data Straddles
Name length Current Current No No Water Road Rail
Sulphur,Point 600m 72ha 511,343 5,(4),p/pmax 24 ✓ ✓ ✓
Mt,Wharves 2000m 113ha BreakObulk,Wharves Nil nil ✓ ✓ ✓
MetroPort, N/A 8ha 113,000
6,Top,lifters,&,1,
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2.4. Road	  Network	  
2.4.1. 	  Introduction	  
The	  State	  Highways	  of	  New	  Zealand	  comprise	  a	  network	  of	  approximately	  11,000km,	  
which	  represent	  12%	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  road	  network.	  These	  highways	  are	  funded	  and	  
maintained	  by	  the	  Government	  through	  the	  NZTA.	  The	  balance	  or	  other	  88%	  of	  the	  
network	  is	  approximately	  83,000km	  of	  Local	  Roads.	  These	  are	  funded	  and	  managed	  by	  
individual	  Territorial	  Authorities	  (Rockpoint,	  2009).	  	  
This	  section	  will	  remain	  focussed	  on	  State	  Highways,	  with	  specific	  interest	  in	  the	  
section	  within	  the	  “Golden	  Triangle”	  which	  will	  have	  relevance	  to	  this	  investigation.	  
NZTA	  advise	  that	  heavy	  vehicles	  using	  the	  State	  Highway	  network	  grew	  by	  3.4%	  in	  
2010	  compared	  to	  2009	  (NZTA,	  2009).	  If	  one	  drills	  down	  to	  a	  regional	  level,	  the	  
Northland	  and	  Auckland	  region	  incurred	  4%	  growth	  while	  the	  Waikato	  and	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty	  incurred	  3.7%	  growth	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  average	  annual	  growth	  of	  heavy	  
vehicles	  using	  the	  State	  Highway	  network	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  is	  3%	  (NZTA,	  2009).	  
The	  National	  Land	  Transport	  Programmes	  (NLTP)	  planned	  investment	  in	  State	  
Highways	  alone	  for	  the	  2009	  /	  2012	  period	  is	  ~$4.6	  billion.	  This	  is	  made	  up	  of	  the	  
following	  National	  Land	  Transport	  Programmes	  (NZTA,	  2009):	  
• New	  and	  improved	  infrastructure	  for	  State	  Highways	  $3.075m	  
• Renewal	  of	  State	  Highways	  $633m	  
• Maintenance	  and	  operation	  of	  State	  Highways	  $897m	  
Road	  transport	  is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  solution	  for	  mass	  container	  aggregation	  
between	  Auckland’s	  two	  inland	  ports	  and	  POT.	  This	  view	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Transport	  (MoT)	  in	  a	  regulatory	  statement	  made	  in	  2010	  where	  MoT	  states	  that	  it	  is	  
doubtful	  that	  road	  transport	  will	  ever	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  transport	  of	  heavy	  cargo	  
such	  as	  processed	  meat	  and	  dairy	  product,	  which	  are	  typical	  of	  the	  containerised	  
export	  commodities	  carried	  by	  shipping	  lines	  (MoT,	  2010).	  This	  study	  assumes	  that	  
most	  of	  the	  long	  haul	  container	  feeder	  movements	  between	  hinterlands	  will	  be	  
undertaken	  by	  rail	  or	  coastal	  shipping	  because	  the	  cargo	  is	  generally	  heavy	  and	  hence	  
not	  efficient	  for	  trucking	  on	  the	  road.	  	  
The	  sheer	  scale	  of	  the	  task	  of	  moving	  an	  estimated	  540,000	  containers	  per	  annum	  in	  
each	  direction	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  road	  weight	  restrictions	  will	  lend	  the	  operation	  
towards	  rail,	  which	  is	  designed	  for	  just	  such	  voluminous	  movement	  of	  cargo.	  The	  New	  
Zealand	  Transport	  Authority	  (NZTA)	  introduced	  new	  legislation	  in	  May	  2010	  allowing	  
for	  vehicle	  dimension	  and	  mass	  amendment.	  This	  effectively	  allows	  for	  the	  road	  
authorities	  to	  issue	  permits	  for	  high	  productivity	  vehicles	  (HPV’s)	  of	  greater	  than	  20	  
meters	  in	  length	  and	  over	  44	  tonnes	  in	  gross	  mass	  to	  operate	  on	  pre	  approved	  routes.	  
It	  is	  apparent	  however	  that	  such	  permits	  will	  not	  be	  issued	  lightly	  in	  that	  the	  operator	  
has	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  road	  and	  equipment	  are	  suitable	  for	  the	  route	  being	  
applied	  for.	  Further	  to	  this	  the	  operator	  is	  required	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  vehicle’s	  
extra	  length	  and	  weight	  will	  provide	  significant	  productivity	  gains	  for	  the	  operation	  
(MoT,	  2010).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  container	  aggregation	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  an	  H	  permitted	  
vehicle	  will	  move	  substantially	  more	  containers	  than	  a	  normal	  heavy	  vehicle,	  as	  the	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incremental	  weight	  of	  adding	  an	  additional	  container	  to	  an	  H	  permitted	  vehicle	  will	  
inevitably	  result	  in	  the	  vehicle	  then	  exceeding	  even	  its	  “H”	  permissions.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  
the	  indivisibility	  of	  a	  container.	  Through	  mixing	  and	  matching,	  H	  permitted	  vehicles	  
may	  be	  able	  to	  load	  a	  combination	  of	  heavy	  and	  light	  containers,	  however	  as	  stated	  
this	  will	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  containers	  that	  will	  have	  to	  be	  
moved.	  
2.4.2. 	  The	  Golden	  Triangle	  road	  network	  
State	  Highways	  provide	  approximately	  5,973km	  of	  network	  across	  New	  Zealand’s	  
North	  Island.	  The	  interregional	  strategic	  corridors	  of	  road	  and	  rail,	  such	  as	  State	  
Highway	  1	  and	  29,	  are	  classified	  as	  nationally	  strategic	  road	  corridors,	  whilst	  the	  North	  
Island	  Main	  Trunk	  and	  East	  Coast	  Main	  Trunk	  are	  classified	  as	  nationally	  strategic	  rail	  
corridors.	  
The	  economic	  prosperity	  of	  the	  regions,	  which	  make	  up	  the	  “Golden	  Triangle”	  depend	  
on	  robust	  and	  resilient	  interregional	  transport	  connections.	  
These	  corridors	  cover	  the	  area	  between	  Auckland,	  Hamilton	  and	  Tauranga,	  New	  
Zealand’s	  “Golden	  Triangle”	  and	  give	  a	  number	  of	  options	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  freight.	  
The	  main	  options	  are:	  
I. Tauranga	  via	  the	  Karangahake	  Gorge	  to	  Auckland	  (Route	  1)	  	  
II. Tauranga	  via	  Kaimai	  Mountain	  Pass	  &	  Matamata	  to	  Auckland	  	  (Route	  2)	  







FIGURE	  2	  -­‐	  Golden	  Triangle	  Road	  Route	  Network	  with	  three	  main	  options	  highlighted.	  (Wises	  Maps,	  December	  
2011	  with	  Pixelmator	  overlay)	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The	  following	  section	  will	  debate	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  these	  routes.	  
2.4.2.1. Route	  1	  (SH1/SH2)	  Tauranga	  –	  Karangahake	  –	  Auckland	  	  
This	  route	  starts	  at	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Terminal	  and	  travels	  up	  
through	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  on	  SH2,	  passing	  through	  the	  Kaimai/Mamaku	  Mountains	  at	  
the	  Karangahake	  Gorge,	  joining	  SH1	  at	  the	  Bombay	  Hills	  and	  continuing	  on	  to	  Auckland.	  
This	  route	  is	  (as	  measured	  from	  start	  point	  and	  ending	  at	  the	  MetroPort	  in	  Southdown,	  
Auckland)	  198.3km.	  It	  takes	  approximately	  3	  hours	  to	  travel	  by	  truck.	  This	  route	  is	  
favoured	  by	  trucking	  companies,	  as	  it	  is	  more	  fuel-­‐efficient	  than	  the	  SH29	  Option	  (Reid,	  
2011).	  This	  route	  is	  slow	  at	  peak	  times	  and	  prone	  to	  closing	  due	  to	  accidents	  and	  
weather	  related	  incidents.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.4.2.2. Route	  2	  (SH1/SH2/SH27/SH29)	  Tauranga	  –	  Matamata	  –	  Auckland	  	  
This	  route	  starts	  at	  the	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Terminal	  and	  travels	  
over	  the	  Kaimai/Mamaku	  Mountain	  pass	  on	  SH29,	  climbing	  up	  from	  sea	  level	  to	  
~499m	  above	  sea	  level	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  crossing	  (Google	  Maps,	  2011),	  turning	  on	  to	  
SH27	  at	  Matamata,	  joining	  SH2	  for	  a	  short	  period	  to	  connect	  to	  SH1	  at	  the	  Bombay	  
Hills	  and	  continuing	  on	  to	  Auckland.	  This	  route	  is	  (as	  measured	  from	  the	  starting	  point	  
and	  ending	  at	  the	  MetroPort	  in	  Southdown,	  Auckland)	  206.6km.	  It	  takes	  approximately	  
3	  hours	  to	  travel	  by	  truck	  and	  results	  in	  higher	  fuel	  consumption	  than	  the	  SH2	  route	  
(Reid,	  2011).	  This	  route	  is	  the	  safest	  of	  the	  three	  options	  largely	  due	  to	  it	  bypassing	  
town	  and	  school	  traffic.	  	  
2.4.2.3. Route	  3	  (SH29/SH1)	  Tauranga	  –	  Hamilton	  –	  Auckland	  	  
This	  route	  starts	  at	  the	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Terminal	  and	  travels	  
over	  the	  Kaimai/Mamaku	  Mountain	  pass	  on	  SH29	  directly	  through	  Hamilton	  and	  then	  
via	  SH1	  to	  Auckland.	  This	  route	  is	  (as	  measured	  from	  the	  starting	  point	  and	  ending	  at	  
the	  MetroPort	  in	  Southdown,	  Auckland)	  225km.	  It	  takes	  approximately	  3.5	  to	  3.75	  
hours	  to	  travel	  by	  truck.	  This	  route	  is	  the	  least	  favoured	  by	  logisticians	  due	  to	  the	  time	  
that	  it	  takes	  to	  complete	  the	  journey.	  The	  delay	  is	  incurred	  by	  travelling	  further,	  but	  
mainly	  by	  having	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  Hamilton	  Metropolis.	  This	  route	  is	  also	  the	  
furthest	  of	  the	  three	  routes	  by	  approximately	  20	  km	  in	  each	  direction,	  adding	  40	  km	  to	  
a	  round	  trip.	  
2.4.2.4. Route	  fragility	  	  
During	  the	  period	  selected	  for	  the	  case	  study	  (the	  month	  of	  August	  2010)	  there	  was	  no	  
road	  closures	  in	  the	  Waikato	  region	  traversed	  by	  the	  three	  routes	  (Green,	  2012).	  For	  
the	  same	  period	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  region,	  one	  of	  the	  routes	  (SH1/2)	  was	  closed	  for	  
two	  hours	  on	  6th	  August	  2010	  in	  the	  Karangahake	  Gorge,	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  accident	  scene	  
to	  be	  cleared	  (Potbury,	  2012).	  This	  stretch	  of	  road	  is	  prone	  to	  closure	  in	  winter	  due	  to	  
flooding,	  road	  accidents	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  black	  ice	  related	  incidents.	  	  	  
	  
[The	  above	  Routes	  are	  highlighted	  on	  a	  full	  size	  map.	  See	  Appendix	  7.12]	  
	  
	  
TABLE	  5	  -­‐	  Golden	  Triangle	  road	  network	  route	  comparisons	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2.5. Rail	  Network	  
2.5.1. 	  Introduction	  
This	  section	  covers	  a	  historical	  overview	  of	  rail	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  The	  North	  and	  South	  
Island.	  It	  specifically	  focuses	  on	  the	  Golden	  Triangle	  and	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
Human	  Resources	  (HR)	  side	  of	  operations.	  	  	  
2.5.2. 	  Historical	  overview	  
“Rail	  has	  a	  history	  that	  involves	  periods	  in	  private	  ownership,	  as	  a	  government	  
department,	  and	  as	  a	  government	  corporation.	  The	  first	  railway	  in	  New	  Zealand	  was	  
opened	  in	  1863.	  Lines	  were	  initially	  built	  by	  provincial	  governments	  and	  tended	  to	  be	  
fragments	  of	  rail	  connecting	  ports	  to	  the	  hinterland.	  In	  1876,	  these	  fragments	  were	  
brought	  under	  central	  government	  control,	  and	  a	  century-­‐long	  process	  began	  of	  
joining	  them	  together	  into	  a	  single	  national	  network.	  Initially,	  moving	  people	  between	  
urban	  centers	  was	  the	  primary	  motivation	  for	  creating	  this	  national	  network,	  while	  
moving	  freight	  long	  distances	  was	  only	  a	  complementary	  use.	  Even	  today	  the	  most	  
heavily	  used	  parts	  of	  the	  network	  involve	  relatively	  short	  distances	  (e.g.	  Auckland	  to	  
Tauranga,	  or	  the	  West	  Coast	  to	  Christchurch),	  rather	  than	  the	  entire	  main	  trunk	  lines.	  
New	  Zealand’s	  difficult	  topography,	  together	  with	  budget	  considerations,	  resulted	  in	  
the	  adoption	  of	  a	  narrow-­‐gauge	  track	  standard,	  which	  has	  constrained	  the	  average	  
speed	  of	  rail	  services	  ever	  since.	  In	  addition,	  the	  country’s	  small	  and	  highly	  dispersed	  
population	  has	  mitigated	  the	  formation	  of	  economies	  of	  density	  (running	  more	  trains	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systems)	  and	  low	  variable	  costs,	  it	  tends	  to	  benefit	  more	  from	  economies	  of	  density	  
than	  economies	  of	  network	  size”	  (National	  Infrastructure	  unit,	  2009)	  
“The	  size	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  national	  rail	  network	  has	  changed	  little	  since	  the	  early	  
1990s,	  and	  is	  approximately	  4,000km”	  (National	  Infrastructure	  Unit,	  2009).	  
2.5.3. 	  National	  network	  overview	  
New	  Zealand	  rail	  infrastructure	  is	  some	  4,000km	  long.	  KiwiRail	  currently	  operates	  
approximately	  960	  trains	  per	  month.	  590	  of	  these	  would	  be	  in	  the	  North	  Island,	  70	  on	  
the	  Rail	  ferry	  service	  between	  Islands	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  300	  in	  the	  South	  Island	  
(KiwiRail,	  2011).	  The	  National	  Infrastructure	  Unit	  describes	  the	  four	  main	  parts	  to	  the	  
rail	  network	  as	  
• “A	  national	  freight	  network,	  carrying	  a	  range	  of	  goods	  but	  with	  a	  comparative	  
advantage	  in	  the	  transport	  of	  bulk	  commodities	  such	  as	  coal,	  milk,	  logs,	  containers	  
and	  steel.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  role	  in	  moving	  containerised	  import/export	  goods	  to	  and	  
from	  major	  ports,	  long-­‐distance	  transport	  of	  containerised	  goods,	  and	  general	  
(inter-­‐modal)	  freight	  between	  major	  cities.	  
• An	  interisland	  ferry	  service,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  KiwiRail	  business	  primarily	  because	  
of	  its	  strategic	  role	  in	  transporting	  rail	  across	  the	  Cook	  Strait,	  acting	  as	  a	  link	  in	  the	  
national	  rail	  network.	  However,	  the	  bulk	  of	  interisland	  ferry	  revenue	  (79	  per	  cent)	  
comes	  from	  commercial	  road	  freight,	  passengers	  and	  their	  vehicles,	  rather	  than	  
from	  rail.	  
• A	  long-­‐distance	  passenger	  service,	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  which	  is	  providing	  a	  
domestic	  and	  international	  tourism	  experience.	  
• Two	  metropolitan	  passenger	  networks,	  in	  Auckland	  and	  Wellington,	  which	  are	  
supported	  by	  ratepayer,	  taxpayer	  and	  road-­‐user	  subsidies	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  
reduced	  congestion	  and/or	  increased	  mobility	  of	  commuters	  brings	  social,	  
economic	  and	  environmental	  benefits”	  (National	  Infrastructure	  Unit,	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	  design	  of	  New	  Zealand	  rail	  network	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  double	  stacking	  of	  
containers	  on	  wagons.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.5.4. 	  Overview	  of	  North	  Island	  freight	  rail	  network	  
The	  North	  Island	  is	  serviced	  by	  the	  main	  trunk	  line	  running	  down	  its	  spine	  from	  
Auckland	  to	  Wellington.	  Auckland	  to	  Northland	  is	  serviced	  by	  a	  secondary	  line	  running	  
from	  Auckland	  to	  Whangarei,	  which	  enjoys	  limited	  use	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  track	  
and	  height	  maximum	  in	  the	  tunnels	  on	  the	  route,	  limiting	  the	  size	  of	  the	  rail	  wagon	  /	  
unit	  /	  container	  size	  that	  can	  be	  used	  on	  this	  line.	  	  
The	  Auckland	  to	  Wellington	  Main	  Trunk	  is	  broken	  into	  three	  main	  sections	  from	  a	  train	  
make	  up	  perspective	  as	  well	  as	  a	  “couplings”	  perspective.	  “Couplings”,	  being	  a	  KiwiRail	  
term,	  includes	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  train	  composition	  including	  driver	  allocation	  
and/or	  switch	  over:	  	  
• Auckland	  to	  Hamilton	  
• Hamilton	  to	  Palmerston	  North	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• Palmerston	  North	  to	  Wellington	  
The	  Tauranga	  link	  branches	  out	  from	  Hamilton	  passing	  through	  the	  Kaimai/Mamaku	  
mountain	  range	  rail	  tunnel	  towards	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty.	  This	  tunnel	  is	  8.9	  km	  long	  and	  
was	  constructed	  between	  1969	  and	  1977	  (Jones,	  2010).	  This	  is	  the	  longest	  rail	  tunnel	  
in	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  Kaimai	  mountain	  range	  is	  a	  formidable	  logistics	  obstacle	  with	  
limited	  transit	  points.	  This	  is	  the	  only	  rail	  link	  from	  the	  Waikato	  main	  trunk	  line	  to	  the	  
Bay	  of	  Plenty.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.5.5. 	  Golden	  Triangle	  rail	  network	  
The	  “Golden	  Triangle”	  or	  Auckland/Hamilton/Tauranga	  route	  is	  approximately	  224km	  
long	  with	  10	  passing	  loops	  where	  trains	  can	  pull	  over	  and	  wait	  to	  cross	  with	  other	  
oncoming	  trains.	  	  
	  
The	  Waikato	  Region	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Central	  Government	  made	  ~$13m	  available	  to	  
KiwiRail	  as	  part	  of	  the	  JOG	  Project	  for	  the	  upgrading	  of	  the	  Waikato	  rail	  network	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  achieving	  mode	  shift	  and	  increasing	  the	  line	  capacity	  between	  the	  
Waikato	  and	  the	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  (Waikato	  Regional	  Council,	  2006).	  Resultant	  from	  
this	  project	  the	  number	  of	  passing	  loops	  has	  been	  increased	  from	  8	  to	  10,	  including	  
improving	  the	  length	  of	  3	  of	  the	  existing	  8	  loops.	  Details	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  JOG	  
Project	  are	  depicted	  in	  the	  table	  below.	  
TABLE	  6	  -­‐	  Impact	  of	  JOG	  Project	  on	  Waikato/BOP	  passing	  loops	  
	  
	  
Currently	  the	  East	  Coast	  Main	  Trunk	  line	  (ECMT)	  (the	  line	  between	  Hamilton	  and	  BOP)	  
operates	  between	  350	  and	  400	  trains	  per	  week.	  21	  of	  these	  are	  POT	  –	  MetroPort	  
trains.	  This	  is	  approximately	  30%	  of	  the	  total	  rail	  loading	  throughout	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  
ECMT	  employs	  15%	  of	  the	  KiwiRail	  workforce.	  This	  stretch	  of	  the	  line	  only	  makes	  up	  
5%	  of	  the	  national	  total,	  however	  it	  conveys	  8	  million	  tonnes	  per	  annum,	  which	  is	  an	  
incredible	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  national	  rail	  freight	  demand.	  
	  
The	  current	  train	  density	  on	  the	  ECMT	  is	  measured	  as	  1.68	  trains	  per	  hour.	  Modelling	  
performed	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  KiwiRail	  planning	  department	  demonstrates	  that	  
the	  ECMT	  can	  comfortably	  accommodate	  2.7	  trains	  per	  hour	  with	  the	  existing	  passing	  
loops	  as	  outlined	  in	  table	  6.	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  train	  density	  had	  to	  exceed	  2.7	  trains	  
Current'Loops Region New'Loops 2006'Length 2011'Length Timing
Ruakura Waikato 742 900 Complete
4 Waikato Eureka 4 900 Complete
Motomaho Waikato 730 900 Complete
Morrinsville Waikato 779 779 4
Kereone Waikato 856 856 4
4 Waikato Tamihana 4 900 Complete
Hemopo Waikato 863 863 4
Whatakao Waikato 870 870 4
Apata BOP 474 900 Jul412
TeHPuna BOP 917 917 4
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per	  hour,	  the	  Apata	  passing	  loop	  would	  become	  crucial	  in	  assisting	  to	  manage	  the	  
added	  density	  above	  2.7	  trains	  per	  hour.	  
The	  “Golden	  Triangle”	  is	  the	  operational	  area	  as	  highlighted	  in	  Figure	  10	  (p.49),	  linking	  
the	  Auckland	  Super	  City	  to	  the	  cities	  of	  Hamilton	  and	  Tauranga.	  Effectively	  this	  links	  
the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty,	  Waikato	  and	  Auckland	  economic	  regions	  together	  from	  a	  rail	  
perspective	  (Rae,	  2011).	  
	  This	  Golden	  Triangle	  network	  carries	  mainly	  freight	  between	  Tauranga	  via	  Hamilton	  to	  
Auckland	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Sections	  of	  this	  line	  are	  also	  used	  for	  bulk	  freight	  trains	  
operating	  between	  the	  POT	  and	  the	  greater	  Waikato	  region,	  for	  example	  pulp,	  paper	  
and	  logs	  from	  Kinleith	  to	  POT	  and	  Coal	  from	  POT	  to	  Huntly	  (Temperton,	  2011).	  
Currently	  the	  POT	  is	  serviced	  by	  3	  MetroPort	  trains	  per	  day	  in	  both	  directions	  moving	  
loaded	  import	  containers	  from	  POT	  to	  MetroPort	  and	  a	  combination	  of	  loaded	  and	  
empty	  containers	  from	  AKL	  to	  TRG.	  The	  loaded	  containers	  are	  invariably	  for	  export	  
emanating	  from	  the	  Waikato,	  Auckland	  or	  Northland	  regions,	  while	  the	  repositioned	  
empty	  containers	  are	  for	  packing	  of	  export	  product	  in	  the	  Tauranga	  area	  and	  in	  some	  
cases	  for	  repositioning	  to	  other	  New	  Zealand	  Ports	  such	  as	  Christchurch	  in	  the	  South	  
Island.	  
TABLE	  7	  -­‐	  Key	  details	  for	  Golden	  Triangle	  rail	  network	  
	  
2.5.6. 	  Human	  resource	  consideration	  
The	  planning	  and	  make	  up	  of	  a	  train	  service	  is	  complex.	  A	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  
complexity	  in	  planning	  a	  new	  service	  at	  KiwiRail,	  or	  making	  a	  change	  to	  any	  existing	  
service,	  such	  as	  adding	  more	  trains	  to	  a	  network	  or	  reducing	  trains	  from	  a	  network,	  
require	  human	  resource	  considerations.	  	  
These	  human	  resource	  factors	  involves	  a	  mixture	  of	  humanitarian	  considerations,	  as	  
well	  as	  Inflexible	  impediments,	  that	  stem	  from	  historical	  employment	  agreements	  
negotiated	  with	  the	  Union	  some	  years	  back.	  
The	  next	  section	  outlines	  a	  number	  of	  these:	  	  	  
• A	  6	  (six)	  weeks	  union	  consultation	  process	  for	  significant	  Locomotive	  Engineers	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week	  period	  could	  become	  an	  eight	  or	  twelve	  week	  period	  or	  remain	  open	  ended.	  
This	  does	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  flexibility	  or	  allow	  KiwiRail	  the	  opportunity	  to	  meet	  
changing	  market	  requirements.	  
• Sourcing	  of	  Locomotive	  Engineers	  to	  operate	  new	  service	  from	  a	  limited	  pool	  of	  
resources.	  
• Scheduling	  in	  a	  ~30	  minute	  personal	  needs	  brake	  for	  the	  Locomotive	  Engineer	  (LE)	  
after	  every	  3	  hours	  on	  duty.	  This	  is	  extremely	  complex	  and	  is	  done	  with	  some	  
variation	  as	  it	  has	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  train	  being	  positioned	  at	  a	  passing	  loop	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  personal	  needs	  brake,	  failing	  which	  the	  train	  would	  block	  the	  main	  
trunk	  line	  for	  ~30	  minutes	  reducing	  the	  network	  train	  density/efficiency.	  
• Ensuring	  that	  no	  LE	  is	  rostered	  on	  to	  work	  for	  more	  than	  76	  to	  83	  hours	  during	  any	  
fortnight.	  
• No	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  operations	  are	  permissible.	  A	  LE	  is	  required	  to	  sign	  off	  of	  duty	  at	  
his	  home	  depot	  where	  his	  shift	  started,	  hence	  the	  LE	  can	  not	  be	  scheduled	  to	  
operate	  a	  train	  from	  Auckland	  to	  Tauranga	  and	  book	  off	  overnight	  in	  Tauranga	  
returning	  with	  a	  train	  the	  following	  day.	  This	  results	  in	  the	  “coupling”	  that	  KiwiRail	  
has	  to	  factor	  in	  to	  planning	  resources.	  	  
As	  seen	  by	  the	  above	  human	  resource	  considerations,	  planning	  for	  schedule	  changes	  
or	  new	  services	  is	  a	  complex	  process.	  It	  is	  the	  intention	  of	  KiwiRail	  to	  attempt	  to	  
address	  some	  of	  these	  issues	  during	  their	  next	  round	  of	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Union	  
(Rae,	  2011).	  
2.6. Road	  versus	  Rail	  	  	  
2.6.1. 	  Introduction	  
This	  section	  compares	  the	  supply	  chains	  between	  road	  and	  rail	  operations.	  The	  
comparative	  analysis	  highlights	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  both	  modes.	  
2.6.2. 	  Supply	  chain	  activity	  of	  a	  MetroPort/POT	  train	  
The	  supply	  chain	  activity	  of	  a	  MetroPort	  train	  is	  split	  into	  two	  sections	  due	  to	  the	  
current	  operational	  methodology	  applied	  by	  KiwiRail	  of	  operating	  two	  separate	  trains,	  
one	  south	  bound	  from	  MetroPort	  Auckland	  and	  one	  north	  bound	  from	  POT.	  The	  two	  
trains	  meet	  each	  other	  in	  Te	  Rapa	  where	  they	  “couple”	  or	  swap	  over	  with	  the	  south	  
bound	  crew	  swapping	  over	  to	  the	  north	  bound	  train	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
The	  following	  two	  tables,	  11	  and	  12,	  are	  a	  flow	  chart	  breaking	  down	  the	  supply	  chain	  
activity	  of	  both	  north	  and	  south	  bound	  MetroPort	  trains	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  detailed	  
understanding	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  various	  activities	  making	  up	  the	  supply	  chain.	  This	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2.6.3. 	  Supply	  chain	  activity	  of	  a	  MetroPort	  /	  POT	  road	  bridge	  
The	  supply	  chain	  activity	  of	  a	  MetroPort	  /	  POT	  road	  bridge	  has	  been	  dissected	  into	  
table	  13	  below.	  This	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  average	  time	  taken	  to	  perform	  a	  specific	  
activity	  to	  be	  matched	  with	  the	  activity	  concerned.	  
The	  total	  time	  taken	  to	  complete	  one	  round	  trip	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  is	  9.25hrs	  for	  one	  
truck	  to	  move	  3	  containers.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  these	  deliberations	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  
one	  truck	  will	  carry	  3	  X	  TEU≈	  per	  round	  trip.	  The	  basis	  of	  this	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  containers	  travelling	  north	  bound	  will	  be	  loaded	  and	  hence	  heavy	  resulting	  
in	  1	  x	  container	  per	  load.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  south	  bound	  volume	  is	  empty	  hence	  the	  
weight	  allows	  for	  a	  truck	  to	  carry	  2	  x	  containers	  per	  load.	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2.6.4 Modal	  analysis	  	  
The	  road	  bridge	  supply	  chain	  is	  not	  as	  complex	  as	  the	  MetroPort	  rail	  operations	  supply	  
chain.	  The	  mode	  comparison	  is	  summarised	  as	  per	  table	  14	  below.	  	  
From	  a	  supply	  chain	  activity	  timing	  perspective	  the	  actual	  time	  in	  motion	  (driving	  time)	  
for	  both	  modes	  is	  vastly	  different	  to	  the	  total	  mode	  supply	  chain	  time	  to	  complete	  the	  
round	  trip.	  Road	  driving	  time	  is	  6	  hours	  vs.	  a	  total	  supply	  chain	  time	  of	  9.25	  hours.	  In	  
the	  case	  of	  rail	  the	  driving	  time	  is	  8.75	  hours	  vs.	  a	  total	  supply	  chain	  time	  of	  26.25	  
hours.	  While	  road-­‐driving	  time	  consumes	  65%	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  time,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
rail,	  only	  33%	  of	  the	  total	  supply	  chain	  time	  is	  taken	  up	  by	  driving.	  This	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  complexity	  of	  planning	  and	  making	  up	  a	  train	  service,	  which	  in	  this	  instance	  carries	  
212	  TEU	  per	  round	  trip	  vs.	  the	  3	  carried	  by	  a	  single	  truck	  performing	  the	  same	  round	  
trip.	  	  
TABLE	  11	  -­‐	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  /	  MetroPort	  Modal	  Comparison	  
	  
Due	  to	  the	  volume	  capabilities	  of	  rail	  vs.	  road,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  road	  bridging	  will	  play	  
a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  movement	  of	  this	  container	  volume	  between	  MetroPort	  and	  POT.	  
That	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  no	  cargo	  will	  be	  moved	  on	  road,	  as	  road	  will	  always	  play	  
some	  role	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  urgent	  cargo,	  perishable	  cargo	  as	  well	  as	  cargo	  arriving	  




Round2trip2distance2by2mode km 397 448
Daily2km22to2move2volume km 154,433 4,928
Weekly2km2move2volume km 1,081,031 34,496
Monthly2km22to2move2volume km 4,684,432 149,482
Annual2extrapolation km 56,213,180 1,793,778
Operational.times
Travelling2time2to2complete2round2trip hr 6 8.75
Total2supply2chain2time2to2complete2round2trip2 hr 9.25 26.25
Assets.required
Daily Trucks2/2Trains 389 11
Weekly Trucks2/2Trains 2723 77
Monthly Trucks2/2Trains 11,800 334
Annual2Extrapolation Trucks2/2Trains 141,595 4,004
Fuel.Consumption.by.mode.by.route
Fuel2consumed2to2complete212x2round2trip Litres2used 234 2400
Average2fuel2consumption2Lit/1002on212x2round2trip Lit/100km 59 536
Carbon.Emissions.by.mode.(CO2)
CO22generated2grams2per2km2for212x2round2trip g/km 1,557.60 14,150.40
CO22generated2kilograms2per2km2for212x2round2trip kg/km 1.5576 14.1504
CO22generated2per2route2for212x2round2trip kgs2of2CO2 618 6,339
Total2daily2carbon2generated2per2route kgs2of2CO2 240,545 69,733
Total2weekly2carbon2generated2per2route kgs2of2CO2 1,683,814 488,132
Total2monthly2carbon2generated2per2route kgs2of2CO2 7,296,471 2,115,223
Annual2extrapolation2of2carbon2generated2per2route kgs2of2CO2 87,557,649 25,382,679
Average2carbon2expended2per2TEU≈2per2route Kg/CO2/TEU≈ 206 30
POT./.MetroPort.modal.comparison
Mode
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Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  data	  available	  from	  the	  road	  transport	  industry,	  an	  assumption	  has	  
been	  made	  that	  Road	  bridging	  will	  handle	  at	  least	  5%	  of	  this	  volume	  transfer	  between	  
POT	  and	  MetroPort.	  
In	  the	  event	  that	  Road	  bridging	  was	  used	  to	  handle	  all	  of	  these	  volumes	  the	  number	  of	  
truckloads	  required	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  running	  in	  each	  direction	  would	  be	  389.	  This	  same	  
volume	  could	  be	  moved	  by	  11	  trains.	  
2.6.4. 	  Modal	  energy	  consumption	  and	  carbon	  production	  
The	  fuel	  consumed	  in	  the	  form	  of	  diesel	  oil	  has	  a	  huge	  variance	  between	  the	  modes	  
with	  Rail	  using	  ~801,221	  litres	  vs.	  road	  using	  ~2,763,815	  to	  perform	  the	  same	  task	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  August	  2010.	  If	  road	  bridging	  was	  the	  mode	  of	  choice,	  this	  type	  of	  fuel	  
consumption	  would	  drive	  complexity	  into	  the	  fuel	  and	  associated	  industries’	  supply	  
chains.	  Delivery	  of	  fuel	  to	  the	  region	  would	  have	  to	  be	  ramped	  up	  with	  the	  supporting	  
storage	  infrastructure	  to	  accommodate	  the	  extra	  stocks.	  The	  storage	  of	  one	  months’	  
fuel	  supply	  would	  require	  2,764m3	  of	  space.	  
The	  energy	  consumed	  would	  generate	  7,296,241	  kgs	  of	  CO2	  on	  road,	  where	  as	  rail	  
would	  be	  2,115,223	  kgs	  of	  CO2.	  This	  equates	  to	  a	  container	  contributing	  206kgs	  of	  CO2	  
on	  road	  vs.	  30	  kgs	  of	  CO2	  on	  rail.	  
The	  following	  factors	  were	  used	  in	  calculating	  the	  CO2	  emissions	  for	  road	  and	  rail	  
transport	  between	  MetroPort	  and	  POT.	  
CO2	  emission	  calculations:	  
• Truck	  =	  59	  lit/100km	  (Reid,	  2012)	  
• Train	  =	  536	  lit/100km	  Specific	  to	  DXR	  Locomotive	  used.	  (O’Donoghue,	  2012)	  
• 1	  x	  litre	  diesel	  burned	  emits	  2.64kg	  of	  carbon	  [CO2]	  (Spritmonitor,	  2012)	  
Energy	  consumed	  /	  carbon	  released	  
• 2	  C8H18	  +	  25	  O2	  	  18	  H2O	  +	  CO2	  =	  2.64kg	  CO2	  
Road	  formula:	  
• (59/100)*(2.64/1)	  =	  1.5576kg/km	  *	  397km	  =	  618kg/co2	  per	  round	  trip	  	  
• /	  3TEU≈	  per	  round	  trip	  =	  ~206kg/co2/TEU≈	  
Rail	  formula:	  
• (536/100)*(2.64/1)	  =	  14.1504kg/km	  *	  448km	  =	  6,339kg/co2	  per	  round	  trip	  
• /	  212TEU≈	  per	  round	  trip	  =	  ~30kg/co2/TEU≈	  
CO2	  per	  tonne	  kilometre	  
• Due	  to	  no	  payload	  data	  being	  made	  available	  per	  container,	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  
perform	  a	  per/tonne/kilometre	  CO2	  factor,	  hence	  the	  results	  are	  reported	  on	  a	  per	  
TEU≈	  basis.	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Road/Rail	  factor	  
• Road	  ~206kg/co2/TEU≈	  /	  Rail~30kg/co2/TEU≈	  factor	  6.87	  
• Road	  generates	  6.87	  times	  more	  carbon	  per	  TEU≈	  than	  what	  rail	  generates	  on	  this	  
specific	  route.	  	  	  
Clearly	  rail	  has	  a	  much	  smaller	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  carbon	  generation	  when	  compared	  
to	  road.	  This	  is	  largely	  gained	  through	  the	  cargo	  capabilities	  of	  a	  train	  vs.	  a	  road	  
operation	  resulting	  in	  a	  far	  more	  efficient	  usage	  of	  fuel	  in	  the	  rail	  operation.	  
It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  environmental	  considerations	  would	  not	  play	  a	  deciding	  role	  in	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  emergency.	  The	  top	  priority	  for	  Logisticians	  would	  
be	  to	  get	  the	  supply	  chain	  operational	  and	  the	  economy	  functioning	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible.	  Only	  once	  the	  supply	  chain	  had	  been	  re-­‐established	  would	  consideration	  be	  
given	  to	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  ways	  to	  improve	  the	  interim	  supply	  chains’	  
carbon	  footprint.	  
The	  outcome	  of	  this	  analysis	  would	  support	  a	  rail	  solution	  to	  the	  aggregation	  of	  this	  
volume	  between	  POT	  and	  MetroPort.	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3. INTERNATIONAL	  CASE	  STUDIES	  
3.1. Introduction	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  ports	  and	  their	  vulnerability	  
after	  a	  natural	  disaster	  and	  outlines	  three	  specific	  case	  studies,	  Chile,	  Japan	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  and	  how	  they	  are	  impacted.	  	  
3.2. Overview	  of	  Ports	  
Ports	  are	  a	  country’s	  gateway	  to	  the	  world	  and	  hugely	  important	  to	  allow	  trade	  and	  
the	  economy	  to	  function	  and	  prosper.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  a	  port	  is	  to	  facilitate	  freight	  
distribution	  by	  acting	  as	  an	  interface	  between	  maritime	  and	  land	  for	  imports	  and	  
exports	  (DP	  World,	  2010).	  They	  allow	  markets	  to	  expand	  for	  producers	  via	  exports,	  
reduced	  prices	  from	  importing	  goods	  and	  services,	  increase	  quality	  and	  choices	  
available	  for	  consumers	  and	  business.	  Ports	  allow	  importers	  to	  benefit	  from	  foreign	  
resources	  and	  investments,	  exporters	  benefit	  from	  larger,	  more	  open	  markets,	  job	  
growth	  in	  transportation	  and	  the	  distribution	  sectors	  (Bingham,	  2007).	  
3.2.1. 	  Sea	  Ports	  
New	  Zealand’s	  nominal	  GDP	  was	  $189.2b	  in	  2010.	  Exports	  accounted	  for	  $41,463b	  
while	  imports	  cost	  40,597b	  (Statistics	  NZ,	  2010).	  If	  one	  considers	  that	  POAL	  and	  POT	  
account	  for	  54%	  of	  the	  country’s	  container	  exports	  and	  67%	  (Table	  1)	  of	  the	  country’s	  
container	  imports,	  the	  ports	  and	  supporting	  network	  infrastructure	  robustness	  or	  
fragility	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  significance,	  with	  potential	  global	  impacts	  from	  an	  
economic	  perspective.	  
The	  Port	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  soon	  discovered	  this	  when	  they	  realised	  the	  major	  economic	  
backlash	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  devastation	  in	  Japan	  from	  the	  2011	  earthquakes	  and	  
tsunamis	  half	  a	  world	  away.	  Approximately	  USD	  $35.3	  billion	  in	  trade	  between	  Japan	  
and	  the	  United	  States	  passed	  through	  the	  Port	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  in	  2010.	  This	  
represented	  15%	  of	  the	  Port’s	  annual	  trade	  and	  it	  accounts	  for	  an	  estimated	  800	  jobs	  
in	  the	  Port	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  (NBC	  Los	  Angeles,	  2011).	  	  
This	  demonstrates	  how	  interlinked	  our	  economies	  have	  become	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
the	  globalisation	  and	  commoditisation	  of	  markets	  and	  products.	  Through	  this	  new	  
world	  trend	  of	  Interlinking	  or	  Globalisation	  we	  assume	  international	  infrastructure	  
fragility	  as	  part	  of	  our	  exposure.	  	  
While	  a	  port	  can	  be	  engineered	  to	  withstand	  various	  levels	  of	  earthquakes	  (PANC,	  
2009),	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  and	  costly	  to	  engineer	  tsunami	  protection	  into	  a	  port’s	  
design,	  which	  by	  nature	  of	  their	  business	  have	  a	  deep	  open	  channel	  to	  the	  ocean	  to	  
allow	  the	  safe	  passage	  of	  vessels	  from	  international	  shipping	  lanes.	  
3.2.2. 	  Inland	  Ports	  
An	  inland	  port	  could	  be	  described	  as	  a	  rail	  or	  barge	  terminal	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  
maritime	  terminal	  with	  regular	  inland	  transport	  services.	  An	  inland	  port	  is	  integrated	  
with	  a	  maritime	  terminal	  and	  allows	  a	  more	  efficient	  access	  to	  the	  inland	  market	  both	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for	  inbound	  and	  outbound	  freight.	  To	  achieve	  this	  requires	  related	  logistical	  activities	  
linked	  with	  the	  terminal,	  such	  as	  distribution	  centres,	  depots	  for	  containers,	  
warehouses	  and	  logistical	  service	  providers	  (Rodrigue,	  2006).	  	  
The	  North	  Island	  of	  New	  Zealand	  has	  two	  inland	  ports,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  situated	  in	  
the	  greater	  Auckland	  region.	  POAL	  has	  the	  Wiri	  freight	  Hub	  that	  includes	  MAF	  and	  
Customs	  functionality;	  hence	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes	  it	  is	  an	  inland	  port	  as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  freight	  hub	  (POAL,	  2011).	  POT	  has	  MetroPort	  situated	  in	  Southdown,	  
which	  also	  includes	  MAF	  and	  Customs	  functionality	  (POT,	  2011).	  Both	  Inland	  ports	  are	  
serviced	  by	  road	  and	  rail.	  	  
Inland	  ports	  are	  becoming	  more	  commonplace	  since	  the	  advent	  of	  containerisation,	  
which	  has	  simplified	  cargo	  management.	  Most	  inland	  ports	  only	  deal	  in	  containerised	  
cargo.	  The	  Tioga	  Group,	  while	  conducting	  a	  study	  of	  <29	  inland	  ports	  and	  related	  
developments,	  has	  found	  that	  although	  the	  projects	  or	  reasons	  for	  developing	  inland	  
ports	  differ	  widely,	  they	  have	  one	  key	  element	  in	  common:	  The	  goal	  of	  developing	  
economic	  activity	  around	  transportation	  infrastructure	  at	  inland	  ports	  (Tioga,	  2006).	  	  
The	  port	  establishing	  an	  inland	  port,	  by	  default	  is	  expanding	  its	  hinterland.	  
Intermodalism	  and	  the	  use	  of	  pipelines	  have	  distorted	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  
“hinterland”	  (Olukoju,	  2006).	  
While	  this	  may	  be	  factually	  correct,	  inadvertently	  the	  Port	  companies,	  by	  establishing	  
inland	  ports,	  are	  de-­‐risking	  the	  supply	  chain	  for	  the	  shippers	  or	  cargo	  owners.	  By	  
establishing	  these	  inland	  ports,	  they	  are	  by	  default	  releasing	  the	  “captivness”	  of	  the	  
cargo	  to	  a	  specific	  port.	  By	  not	  being	  captive	  to	  a	  specific	  port,	  the	  cargo	  owner	  has	  the	  
choice	  of	  switching	  to	  a	  different	  port	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  disruption	  of	  any	  kind	  at	  the	  
normal	  port	  of	  entry	  or	  exit.	  As	  an	  example	  an	  importer	  or	  exporter	  can	  consign	  cargo	  
from	  or	  to	  MetroPort	  or	  Wiri.	  Whether	  the	  cargo	  exits	  or	  enters	  NZ	  through	  POAL	  or	  
POT	  is	  irrelevant,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  importer’s	  /	  exporter’s	  time	  and	  price	  criteria	  are	  met.	  
Both	  MetroPort	  and	  Wiri	  are	  serviced	  by	  rail	  and	  road,	  which	  can	  access	  any	  port	  of	  
choice	  of	  the	  shipper	  (Own	  industry	  experience,	  2012).	  
Sydney	  Ports	  and	  Hutchison	  Port	  Holdings	  (HPH)	  recently	  made	  a	  joint	  announcement	  
that	  HPH	  had	  been	  appointed	  operator	  of	  the	  Enfield	  Intermodal	  Logistics	  Centre	  (ILC),	  
which	  is	  located	  18	  km	  from	  Port	  Botany.	  Lloyds	  List	  Publication	  advises	  that	  this	  ILC	  is	  
expected	  to	  handle	  up	  to	  300,000	  TEU	  per	  annum,	  which	  represents	  some	  40%	  of	  port	  
related	  freight.	  This	  ILC	  will	  be	  serviced	  by	  rail	  moving	  containers	  to	  and	  from	  the	  Port.	  
This	  is	  estimated	  to	  cut	  carbon	  emissions	  by	  over	  1,000	  tonnes	  per	  annum	  and	  save	  
6,5million	  truck	  kilometres	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  This	  facility	  will	  also	  provide	  much	  
needed	  empty	  container	  storage	  for	  the	  Port	  (Sydney	  Ports,	  2011).	  
Ports	  who	  are	  tsunami	  prone,	  should	  consider	  that	  one	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  developing	  an	  
inland	  port	  is,	  that	  by	  default,	  they	  are	  de-­‐risking	  their	  profile	  and	  that	  of	  their	  
customers	  who	  own	  the	  cargo.	  Ports	  should	  give	  consideration	  to	  modelling	  the	  
staging	  of	  receipt,	  delivery	  and	  storage	  of	  containers	  at	  an	  off-­‐port	  locality,	  such	  as	  an	  
inland	  port.	  	  This	  practice	  would	  effectively	  minimise	  damage	  and	  loss	  of	  cargo	  
awaiting	  vessel	  arrivals/consignee	  collection.	  The	  modelling	  could	  focus	  on	  delivering	  
containers	  to	  ship	  side	  and	  clearing	  containers	  from	  shipside	  on	  a	  just-­‐in-­‐time	  basis.	  In	  
	   26	  
the	  event	  of	  a	  tsunami,	  the	  majority	  of	  cargo	  would	  be	  secure	  and	  could	  be	  diverted	  to	  
a	  neighbouring	  port	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  repairs	  or	  clean	  up	  of	  any	  damage	  to	  the	  
original	  port.	  
3.3. Overview	  by	  Countries	  
The	  earthquakes	  affecting	  Chile	  in	  2010,	  Japan	  and	  New	  Zealand	  in	  2011	  are	  recent	  
events	  that	  have	  been	  selected	  due	  to	  their	  similarities	  and	  resultant	  supply	  chain	  
disruption.	  The	  commonality	  shared	  by	  these	  events	  is	  that	  all	  three	  of	  these	  countries	  
sit	  on	  the	  Pacific	  Rim	  of	  Fire	  and	  in	  each	  event	  the	  Ports	  infrastructure	  sustained	  
damage	  with	  subsequent	  closures.	  	  	  
3.3.1. 	  Chile	  
The	  earthquakes	  that	  struck	  Chile	  in	  February	  2010	  resulted	  in	  massive	  damage	  to	  the	  
country’s	  infrastructure	  leaving	  more	  than	  1.5mil	  people	  displaced.	  The	  major	  port	  
Valparaíso	  covering	  the	  capital	  city	  Santiago	  was	  forced	  to	  close	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  
damage	  to	  be	  assessed	  (Barrionuevo,	  2010).	  The	  port	  reopened	  5	  days	  later	  with	  
approximately	  30%	  operationability.	  Wharves	  had	  to	  be	  repaired,	  as	  did	  surrounding	  
buildings.	  Valparaíso	  Port	  services	  Chile’s	  largest	  city	  Santiago,	  which	  is	  116km	  away	  
(Chilean	  Government,	  2011).	  Valparaíso	  is	  a	  crucial	  link	  in	  the	  country’s	  trade	  and	  
tourism	  business.	  Many	  passenger	  cruisers	  had	  to	  bypass	  their	  planned	  stops	  at	  
Valparaíso	  due	  to	  port	  closure,	  damages	  as	  well	  as	  further	  infrastructure	  damage	  in	  
Santiago.	  While	  damaged,	  the	  port	  reopened	  reasonably	  quickly	  to	  allow	  vital	  rescue	  
and	  recovery	  related	  cargo	  as	  well	  as	  fuel	  supplies	  to	  continue	  flowing	  into	  Chile	  
(Barrionuevo,	  2010).	  	  
The	  port	  of	  Valparaíso	  services	  one	  of	  Chile’s	  most	  important	  urban	  centres,	  Santiago.	  
With	  nine	  universities,	  it	  is	  a	  centre	  for	  education.	  Its	  most	  important	  industries	  are	  
culture,	  transport	  and	  tourism	  (World	  Port	  Source,	  2011).	  During	  the	  2007	  year,	  the	  
port	  handled	  9.7mil	  tonnes	  of	  cargo.	  This	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  6.3mil	  tonnes	  packed	  
into	  ~845	  thousand	  TEU≈	  and	  1.2mil	  tonnes	  of	  break-­‐bulk	  cargo.	  [5.3mil	  tonnes	  were	  
exports	  and	  3.7mil	  tonnes	  were	  imports.]	  The	  port	  also	  handled	  116	  thousand	  
passengers	  off	  of	  48	  cruise	  vessels.	  The	  main	  exports	  out	  of	  the	  Valparaíso	  region	  are	  
wine,	  copper	  and	  fresh	  fruit	  (World	  Port	  Source,	  2011).	  Chile	  is	  the	  world’s	  third	  
largest	  copper	  supplier	  with	  the	  copper	  mines	  situated	  north	  of	  Santiago	  (MSNBC,	  
2010).	  	  	  
The	  Chilean	  export	  port	  of	  Talcahuano	  (servicing	  a	  major	  manufacturing,	  
petrochemical,	  forestry,	  fishing	  and	  trade	  hub)	  was	  also	  forced	  to	  close	  after	  roads	  and	  	  	  
major	  bridges	  collapsed	  (MSNBC,	  2010).	  	  Some	  2mil	  metric	  tonnes	  of	  fish	  catch	  is	  at	  
risk	  due	  to	  the	  unloading	  piers	  and	  equipment	  being	  severely	  damaged.	  This	  port	  
services	  the	  city	  of	  Concepción,	  the	  third	  largest	  city	  in	  Chile.	  The	  port	  was	  also	  home	  
to	  the	  ASMAR	  Shipyard,	  which	  builds	  commercial	  as	  well	  as	  military	  ships	  up	  to	  
50,000dwt	  (Shipyards	  Directory,	  2012).	  	  The	  ASMAR	  shipyard	  was	  government	  owned	  
and	  operated	  by	  the	  Chilean	  Navy	  (Pearce,	  1980).	  The	  port	  was	  destroyed	  by	  the	  
15meter	  tsunami	  waves	  (LA	  Times,	  2010).	  The	  port	  remains	  closed	  today,	  some	  658	  
days	  later	  while	  a	  total	  rebuild	  has	  to	  take	  place.	  Agriculture	  in	  the	  region	  has	  been	  
severely	  impacted	  firstly	  by	  earthquake	  damage	  and	  secondly	  by	  infrastructure	  
devastation	  effectively	  blocking	  cargos	  from	  reaching	  export	  markets.	  Estimates	  for	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the	  repair	  of	  damages	  to	  infrastructure	  in	  Chile	  run	  into	  the	  hundreds	  of	  billions	  of	  US	  








	   28	  
	  
FIGURE	  4	  -­‐	  Vessel	  and	  Port	  Damage	  at	  Talcahuano	  Port,	  Chile	  (PIANC,	  2009)	  
	  
3.3.2. 	  Japan	  
The	  Japanese	  earthquake	  &	  subsequent	  tsunamis	  of	  March	  2011	  devastated	  the	  port	  
of	  Sendai	  servicing	  the	  Tōhoku	  Prefecture,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  commercial	  
centres	  in	  Japan.	  Whole	  towns	  were	  flattened	  by	  the	  tsunamis,	  which	  hit	  the	  area	  in	  
waves	  (USGS,	  2010).	  Most	  of	  the	  Sendai	  port	  infrastructure	  was	  badly	  damaged	  or	  
washed	  away	  in	  the	  tsunami.	  The	  nearby	  Fukushima	  nuclear	  power	  plant,	  which	  was	  
also	  damaged	  by	  the	  tsunami	  waves,	  resulted	  in	  radiation	  leaking	  out	  of	  the	  plant,	  
causing	  further	  complications	  from	  a	  logistics	  perspective.	  The	  port	  was	  closed	  for	  
more	  than	  200	  days	  before	  receiving	  the	  first	  container	  ship	  on	  30	  September	  2011.	  
This	  port	  closure	  had	  a	  dramatic	  impact	  on	  the	  commerce	  of	  the	  region	  and	  any	  search,	  




	   29	  
	  
FIGURE	  5	  -­‐	  Sendai	  Port	  drift	  away	  containers	  and	  cargo	  handling	  equipment	  (Shibasake,	  2011)	  
	  
Manufacturers	  and	  exporters	  in	  the	  area	  such	  as	  refineries,	  steel	  industry,	  chemical	  
plants,	  auto	  industry	  and	  the	  paper	  industry,	  have	  all	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  expensive	  trucking	  
options	  on	  the	  few	  operable	  roads	  to	  enable	  their	  business	  import	  and	  export	  goods	  to	  
flow	  (Gonorth,	  2012).	  Alternate	  ports	  had	  to	  be	  used	  such	  as	  Tokyo,	  Yokohama,	  and	  
Niigata.	  Loss	  of	  life	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  earthquake	  and	  subsequent	  complications	  is	  more	  
than	  17,000	  people	  dead	  or	  missing	  and	  thousands	  more	  injured.	  The	  financial	  cost	  of	  
the	  disaster	  is	  not	  yet	  fully	  quantified,	  but	  conservative	  estimates	  are	  in	  excess	  of	  
$300b	  US	  (Globalworks,	  2011).	  	  
As	  the	  third	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world,	  Japan’s	  GDP	  at	  $5.5trillion,	  accounts	  for	  
8.7%	  of	  global	  GDP.	  The	  net	  impact	  of	  the	  disaster	  on	  global	  GDP	  is	  that	  it	  is	  expected	  
to	  shave	  about	  a	  half	  percentage	  point	  off	  global	  economic	  growth	  with	  about	  half	  of	  
that	  effect	  confined	  to	  Japan	  itself	  (CRS,	  2011).	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FIGURE	  6	  -­‐	  Map	  representing	  area	  impacted	  by	  Japanese	  earthquake	  and	  tsunami	  of	  2011	  (FAS.org,	  2011)	  
	  
3.3.3. 	  New	  Zealand	  
The	  22	  February	  2011	  Christchurch	  earthquake	  resulted	  in	  a	  port	  closure	  of	  4	  days	  
(Pacifica,	  2011).	  The	  earthquake	  caused	  extensive	  damage	  to	  wharves	  and	  other	  port	  
equipment.	  The	  infrastructure	  around	  the	  port	  including	  roads,	  rail	  and	  the	  Lyttelton	  
Tunnel	  was	  also	  damaged.	  The	  city	  of	  Christchurch	  sustained	  major	  damage	  to	  
buildings,	  both	  in	  the	  city	  and	  the	  suburbs.	  One	  hundred	  and	  eighty	  one	  people	  
perished	  and	  many	  hundreds	  were	  injured	  (TV3,	  2011).	  The	  port	  recovered	  relatively	  
quickly	  and	  reopened	  to	  limited	  operationability	  after	  only	  4	  days	  of	  closure	  (LPCC,	  
2011).	  The	  cost	  of	  the	  Christchurch	  earthquake	  is	  estimated	  at	  $30b,	  which	  is	  
approximately	  22	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  (STATS	  NZ,	  2012).	  
Due	  to	  the	  regionalised	  nature	  of	  the	  Christchurch	  earthquake,	  the	  logistics	  industry	  
were	  able	  to	  immediately	  use	  the	  neighbouring	  port	  of	  Timaru	  as	  a	  temporary	  
alternative	  for	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  exports	  and	  imports	  from	  the	  region.	  Having	  this	  
port	  in	  relative	  close	  proximity	  to	  Christchurch	  also	  allowed	  the	  fuel	  supplies	  to	  
continue	  to	  flow	  into	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  emergency	  supplies	  and	  aid.	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FIGURE	  7	  -­‐	  Map	  representing	  area	  of	  impact	  of	  Christchurch	  earthquake	  of	  2011	  (GeoNet,	  2011)	  
	  
3.3.4. 	  Summary	  
In	  table	  12	  below	  is	  a	  comparison	  of	  natural	  disasters	  resulting	  in	  the	  closures	  of	  4	  
international	  ports.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  all	  four	  of	  the	  ports	  had	  to	  close,	  
however	  Valparaíso	  and	  Lyttelton	  managed	  to	  reopen	  after	  5	  &	  4	  days	  respectively.	  
Both	  of	  these	  ports	  experienced	  relatively	  small	  tsunamis,	  or	  no	  tsunamis.	  The	  two	  
ports	  that	  were	  hit	  by	  large	  tsunamis	  after	  the	  earthquakes	  remained	  closed	  for	  
extended	  periods.	  Sendai,	  hit	  by	  10-­‐meter	  waves,	  had	  to	  close	  for	  more	  than	  seven	  
months	  and	  Talcahuano,	  which	  was	  overwhelmed	  by	  15-­‐meter	  waves,	  was	  damaged	  
to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  wharves	  and	  surrounding	  buildings	  have	  to	  be	  rebuilt.	  The	  
port	  remains	  closed	  more	  than	  a	  year	  after	  the	  waves	  first	  hit.	  	  	  
It	  is	  apparent	  after	  conducting	  this	  research,	  that	  the	  destructive	  force	  of	  large	  
tsunamis	  is	  far	  more	  catastrophic	  to	  ports	  and	  immediate	  surrounds	  infrastructure	  
than	  the	  earthquake	  alone.	  The	  tsunamis	  affecting	  Sendai	  port	  in	  Japan	  and	  
Talcahuano	  port	  in	  Chile	  appear	  to	  have	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  converting	  the	  severe	  
damage	  caused	  by	  the	  earthquake,	  which	  can	  be	  reasonably	  localised,	  into	  total	  
devastation	  having	  a	  far	  greater	  impact	  on	  the	  region.	  	  This	  statement	  is	  supported	  by	  
the	  reasonably	  quick	  recovery	  of	  Valparaíso	  port	  in	  Chile	  and	  Lyttelton	  Port	  of	  
Christchurch	  New	  Zealand	  of	  5	  and	  4	  days	  respectively,	  where	  no	  or	  relatively	  small	  
tsunamis	  were	  experienced	  after	  the	  earthquakes.	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4.	   OVERVIEW	  OF	  AUCKLAND/TAURANGA	  
4.1 	  Introduction	  
The	  assumption	  is	  the	  POAL	  is	  closed	  for	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010	  as	  a	  result	  of	  some	  
disaster	  (natural	  or	  man	  made).	  
This	  chapter	  highlights	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  road,	  rail,	  POT	  infrastructure	  and	  supporting	  
systems,	  when	  the	  total	  load	  of	  all	  containers	  normally	  handled	  by	  POAL	  during	  August	  
2010	  are	  diverted	  to	  POT.	  The	  volume	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  supply	  chain	  from	  the	  time	  that	  
the	  vessel	  arrives	  at	  the	  POT,	  the	  marine/land	  transfer	  through	  to	  making	  the	  
container	  available	  for	  collection	  at	  MetroPort	  in	  Southdown,	  Auckland.	  All	  activities	  
between	  these	  two	  supply	  chain	  points	  are	  analysed	  and	  discussed	  with	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  simulations	  reported.	  
4.2 Setting	  the	  Scene	  
It	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  for	  many	  years	  New	  Zealand	  Ports	  have	  not	  reported	  container	  volumes	  
through	  to	  Statistics	  New	  Zealand	  (STATS	  NZ)	  as	  part	  of	  statutory	  reporting.	  	  Currently	  
STATS	  NZ	  only	  requires	  NZ	  Ports	  to	  report	  on	  commodities	  imported/exported	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  actual	  tonnage	  of	  such	  imports	  and	  exports	  as	  part	  of	  statutory	  reporting.	  	  The	  
outcome	  of	  this	  current	  recording	  system	  does	  not	  allow	  accurate	  details	  on	  container	  
movements.	  	  
Ports	  competing	  against	  each	  other	  for	  the	  same	  container	  business	  from	  the	  various	  
shipping	  lines	  plying	  the	  New	  Zealand	  import/export	  trade	  exacerbate	  this	  situation.	  	  
Information	  has	  traditionally	  been	  withheld	  or	  supplied	  with	  creative	  rounding	  up	  or	  
down	  to	  protect	  the	  port	  supplying	  the	  data	  as	  Ports	  have	  traditionally	  viewed	  this	  as	  
proprietary	  information.	  
At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  research,	  consideration	  was	  given	  to	  using	  the	  OKA	  model	  to	  assist	  
with	  predicting	  the	  various	  network	  flows.	  After	  realising	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  total	  
availability	  of	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  influences	  where	  land	  availability	  required	  
discussion,	  it	  soon	  became	  evident	  that	  it	  would	  be	  pointless	  to	  use	  the	  OKA	  Model,	  as	  
the	  data	  required	  for	  input	  was	  not	  forthcoming.	  After	  the	  available	  data	  was	  
considered,	  it	  was	  established	  that	  simple	  simulation	  would	  be	  possible	  using	  Excel	  
spread	  sheeting	  as	  a	  tool	  and	  the	  more	  complex	  modelling	  of	  the	  OKA	  was	  pointless	  
due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  required	  data.	  
Resulting	  from	  these	  current	  statutory	  reporting	  practices,	  it	  is	  not	  uncommon	  to	  
encounter	  reports	  or	  seminar	  presentations	  with	  varying	  interpretations	  of	  New	  
Zealand	  container	  import	  and	  export	  volumes.	  
The	  container	  import/export	  data	  used	  in	  this	  dissertation	  has	  two	  sources,	  namely	  
Ports	  of	  Auckland	  and	  Port	  of	  Tauranga.	  	  Both	  Ports	  were	  approached	  for	  data	  to	  allow	  
this	  risk	  analysis	  project.	  	  Both	  Ports	  agreed	  to	  this.	  	  The	  following	  data	  was	  supplied:	  
• POAL	  
o A	  summary	  of	  all	  container	  trade	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Market	  for	  the	  2010	  
calendar	  year	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  industry	  overview.	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o Specific	  data	  relating	  to	  container	  imports	  and	  exports	  through	  the	  POAL	  
for	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010.	  
• POT	  
o Specific	  data	  relating	  to	  container	  imports	  and	  exports	  through	  POT,	  
including	  the	  MetroPort	  for	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010.	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1,	  under	  Scope	  and	  Limitations	  in	  section	  1.6,	  it	  was	  agreed	  to	  
utilise	  the	  container	  volumes	  for	  August	  2010,	  as	  this	  would	  reflect	  a	  normal	  operating	  
month	  for	  both	  Ports.	  This	  was	  agreed	  to	  by	  both	  POAL	  and	  POT.	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  clarity,	  the	  following	  explanations	  are	  supplied	  for	  container,	  
restow	  and	  tranship:	  
• Where	  the	  word	  container	  is	  used	  in	  this	  document,	  it	  is	  specifically	  referring	  to	  
Twenty	  Foot	  Equivalent	  Units	  or	  TEU≈	  as	  reported,	  recorded	  and	  accounted	  for	  by	  
all	  NZ	  Ports	  when	  aggregating	  annual	  volumes	  handled	  by	  the	  specific	  Ports.	  
• Restow	  means	  that	  the	  container	  is	  offloaded	  from	  the	  vessel	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
balancing	  the	  load	  to	  the	  stow	  plan	  of	  the	  vessel.	  It	  is	  standard	  practice	  to	  attempt	  
to	  load	  all	  of	  the	  heaviest	  containers	  nearer	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  vessel,	  as	  this	  gives	  
the	  vessel	  stability	  in	  heavy	  seas	  and	  does	  not	  result	  in	  the	  vessel	  becoming	  top-­‐
heavy.	  When	  the	  ship	  planner	  works	  out	  the	  stow	  plan	  they	  also	  have	  to	  factor	  in	  
the	  destination	  of	  the	  container	  as	  it	  would	  not	  be	  cost	  effective	  to	  unpack	  the	  
entire	  vessel	  at	  the	  first	  discharge	  port	  to	  access	  a	  heavy	  container	  in	  the	  bottom	  
of	  the	  stow.	  This	  process	  does	  result	  in	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  restowing	  at	  most	  
ports	  where	  a	  vessel	  loads	  and	  discharges	  containers.	  Ports	  traditionally	  account	  
for	  this	  activity	  as	  part	  of	  the	  container	  volumes	  that	  are	  handled	  and	  they	  
reported	  as	  such.	  
• Tranship	  means	  that	  a	  container	  is	  transferred	  from	  one	  shipping	  lane	  to	  another	  
shipping	  lane	  to	  enable	  the	  container	  to	  reach	  its	  destination.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  in	  
New	  Zealand	  could	  be	  a	  feeder	  shipping	  service	  or	  a	  coastal	  shipping	  service	  
repositioning	  a	  container	  from	  Port	  of	  Nelson	  to	  POAL	  where	  the	  container	  will	  be	  
transhipped	  to	  an	  international	  service,	  which	  does	  not	  call	  at	  Nelson.	  This	  practice	  
opens	  up	  regional	  ports	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  and	  enables	  exporters	  to	  ship	  the	  
cargo	  from	  the	  nearest	  regional	  port	  to	  their	  production	  facility.	  	  This	  practice	  is	  
also	  accounted	  for	  by	  ports	  as	  part	  of	  the	  container	  volume	  that	  they	  handle	  
4.2.1 	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  volume	  for	  August	  2010	  
POAL	  handled	  71,453	  containers	  during	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010	  as	  summarised	  in	  
table	  13	  below.	  Of	  this	  volume	  only	  30,248	  were	  physically	  imported	  and	  21,561	  made	  
up	  the	  total	  of	  the	  exports.	  The	  balance	  of	  19,644	  containers	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  
restow	  and	  tranship.	  	  
Restow	  and	  tranship	  volumes	  accounted	  for	  26%	  of	  all	  container	  movements	  at	  the	  
POAL	  during	  August	  2010.	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TABLE	  13	  -­‐	  Ports	  of	  Auckland	  Container	  Volume	  for	  August	  2010	  
	  
4.2.2 	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  volume	  for	  August	  2010	  
POT	  handled	  49,503	  containers	  during	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010	  as	  summarised	  in	  
table	  14	  below.	  Of	  this	  volume	  only	  18,723	  were	  physically	  imported	  and	  23,489	  made	  
up	  the	  total	  of	  the	  exports.	  The	  balance	  of	  7,291	  containers	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  restow	  
and	  tranship.	  Restow	  and	  tranship	  volume	  accounted	  for	  13%	  of	  all	  container	  
movements	  at	  the	  POT	  during	  August	  2010.	  This	  is	  equal	  to	  37%	  of	  the	  restow	  and	  
tranship	  volume	  that	  POAL	  handled	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  Obviously	  if	  the	  POAL	  
volume	  is	  added	  to	  the	  POT	  volume,	  this	  will	  seriously	  challenge	  the	  POT	  shore	  
operations.	  	  
TABLE	  14	  -­‐	  POT	  Container	  Volumes	  for	  August	  2010	  
	  
4.2.3 	  Combining	  both	  Ports’	  volumes	  for	  August	  2010	  
The	  consolidated	  volumes	  as	  depicted	  in	  Table	  15	  below,	  for	  both	  POAL	  and	  POT	  for	  
the	  month	  of	  August	  2010	  total	  120,956	  containers.	  All	  of	  these	  containers	  have	  to	  be	  
handled	  at	  shipside,	  however	  the	  imports	  make	  up	  48,917	  containers	  and	  the	  Exports	  
total	  45,050	  containers.	  Transhipped	  or	  restowed	  containers	  contribute	  26,935	  of	  the	  
total	  or	  20%.	  	  	  
















Type POAL POT Total
Imports 30,248 18,723 48,971
Exports 21,561 23,489 45,050
Tranship 18,329 6,357 24,686
Restow 1,315 934 2,249
Total 71,453 49,503 120,956
Total&Container&workload&for&Port&of&Tauranga&for&August&2010
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4.2.4 	  Feasibility	  of	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  picking	  up	  the	  task	  
To	  assess	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  POT	  having	  the	  capability	  of	  picking	  up	  the	  task	  of	  
handling	  POAL	  volumes	  on	  top	  of	  their	  existing	  volumes,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  segment	  the	  
activities	  into	  some	  sort	  of	  logical	  order	  to	  enable	  iterations	  to	  be	  run.	  	  	  
4.2.5 	  Determination	  of	  vessels	  to	  be	  handled	  
Multi	  purpose	  vessels	  were	  removed	  from	  the	  data,	  as	  they	  load	  a	  mixture	  of	  
containers	  and	  bulk	  cargos,	  and	  normally	  berth	  at	  General	  Wharves	  and	  not	  Container	  
Wharves.	  POAL	  handled	  49	  container	  vessels	  and	  POT	  handled	  46	  container	  vessels	  for	  
the	  month	  of	  August	  2010.	  This	  totals	  to	  95	  container	  vessel	  port	  calls	  (Table	  16).	  Of	  
these	  95	  vessels,	  20	  were	  common	  to	  both	  ports.	  If	  the	  20	  common	  vessels	  were	  
deducted	  from	  the	  total	  this	  would	  leave	  75	  vessels	  to	  be	  handled.	  [Appendix	  7.3]	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  assessment	  the	  total	  of	  95	  vessels	  will	  be	  used	  as	  it	  is	  highly	  
likely	  that	  the	  POT	  would	  still	  have	  to	  handle	  the	  20	  vessels	  twice	  due	  to	  the	  common	  
practice	  of	  these	  shared	  vessels	  arriving	  at	  POAL	  to	  discharge	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
import	  cargo	  into	  New	  Zealand,	  followed	  by	  various	  NZ	  port	  calls	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  fill	  
the	  vessel	  with	  export	  cargo.	  These	  voyages	  normally	  culminate	  in	  POT	  as	  the	  last	  call	  
where	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cargo	  is	  loaded	  and	  the	  vessel	  is	  finalised	  before	  departing	  
the	  New	  Zealand	  seaboard	  for	  international	  destinations.	  
TABLE	  16	  -­‐	  Summary	  of	  total	  container	  vessels	  to	  be	  serviced	  by	  POT	  
	  
In	  the	  interests	  of	  continuing	  to	  fill	  the	  vessels	  and	  distribute	  the	  empty	  containers	  
after	  the	  import	  cargo	  has	  been	  unpacked,	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  this	  practice	  would	  
continue	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  POAL	  being	  replaced	  with	  POT	  as	  the	  first	  and	  last	  port	  
call.	  
Accordingly	  95	  container	  vessel	  port	  calls	  will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  POT	  
capabilities	  during	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010.	  	  
4.2.6 	  Berth	  occupancy	  and	  capabilities	  	  
POT	  had	  a	  600m-­‐vessel	  berth	  at	  Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Terminal	  as	  at	  August	  2010.	  
The	  berth	  is	  currently	  being	  extended	  by	  200m	  to	  enable	  three	  vessels	  to	  be	  worked	  at	  
most	  times.	  The	  600m	  berths	  will	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  POT	  capabilities	  to	  handle	  the	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FIGURE	  8	  -­‐	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  	  -­‐	  Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Berths	  
During	  the	  month	  of	  August	  the	  POT	  Sulphur	  Point	  berth	  occupancy	  was	  43.52%	  while	  
resource	  utilisation	  to	  service	  the	  berths	  was	  33.14%.	  This	  leaves	  an	  average	  of	  10.38%	  
idle	  time	  at	  the	  berth	  while	  the	  vessel	  is	  not	  being	  worked.	  This	  is	  the	  time	  that	  vessels	  
use	  for	  vessel	  husbandry	  and	  awaiting	  tidal	  windows	  to	  allow	  for	  safe	  departure.	  
4.2.7 	  Times,	  reasons	  and	  assumptions	  
Assumed	  Berth	  SPACE	  Occupancy	  factor.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  these	  iterations,	  
assumptions	  have	  had	  to	  be	  made	  on	  the	  number	  of	  berths	  occupied.	  The	  assumption	  
derived	  at	  is	  2.3	  berths	  used	  on	  average	  @	  24	  hours	  for	  the	  31	  days	  of	  August	  2010.	  
Due	  to	  limited	  data	  being	  supplied	  in	  different	  format	  by	  the	  two	  Ports,	  not	  including	  
the	  vessel	  length,	  vessel	  draft,	  the	  number	  of	  container	  exchanges	  per	  vessel,	  tidal	  
windows,	  and	  berth	  activity/maintenance	  down	  time,	  assumptions	  had	  to	  be	  made.	  
This	  assumption	  is	  based	  on	  diagrammatic	  berth	  occupancy	  slides	  extracted	  from	  
various	  presentations	  made	  by	  the	  POT	  depicting	  that	  the	  berth	  occupancy	  to	  service	  
the	  vessels	  calling	  for	  the	  specific	  period	  was	  2.3	  berths	  used	  on	  average	  at	  any	  given	  
time	  (McColgan,	  2011).	  [Appendix	  7.4]	  
Assumed	  Maximum	  Berth	  TIME	  Availability	  factor.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  hours	  available	  
for	  berthing	  at	  Sulphur	  Point	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
24	  hours	  x	  2.3	  ~berths	  space	  required	  x	  31	  days	  of	  August	  2010	  =	  1,711	  possible	  hours	  
to	  work	  vessels	  per	  month.	  
4.2.8 	  Wharf	  operations	  
Wharf	  activities	  drive	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  the	  berth	  cranes	  can	  operate	  and	  have	  a	  
large	  impact	  on	  the	  number	  of	  crane	  moves	  per	  hour.	  The	  congestion	  density	  on	  wharf	  
has	  a	  direct	  correlation	  to	  the	  berth	  crane	  productivity	  as	  measured	  in	  net	  crane	  rate	  
or	  crane	  moves	  per	  hour	  (NCR).	  Ports	  are	  normally	  not	  forthcoming	  in	  sharing	  Wharf	  
congestion	  information	  due	  to	  its	  potential	  to	  allow	  analysts	  to	  unravel	  other	  propriety	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information	  by	  utilising	  this	  denominator.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  POT,	  previous	  graphic	  
representation	  of	  port	  congestion	  and	  subsequent	  escalating	  impact	  on	  crane	  
productivity	  slides	  presented	  at	  a	  BOP	  Risk	  Symposium	  (McColgan,	  2011)	  have	  been	  
used	  to	  determine	  an	  average	  ratio	  of	  port	  congestion	  and	  subsequent	  flow	  on	  berth	  
crane	  impact.	  Optimal	  operations	  to	  allow	  NCR	  to	  achieve	  33	  lifts	  per	  hour	  can	  be	  
equated	  to	  a	  range	  between	  1	  to	  3.49	  containers	  stored	  per	  ground	  slot	  with	  a	  limited	  
ground	  slot	  allocation	  of	  4615	  currently	  in	  existence	  at	  Sulphur	  Point.	  Incremental	  
increases	  in	  containers	  stored	  per	  ground	  slot	  over	  and	  above	  3.49	  directly	  impacts	  the	  
speed	  with	  which	  the	  straddle	  crane	  services	  can	  feed	  the	  berth	  crane.	  This	  is	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  congestion	  factor	  driving	  the	  number	  of	  re-­‐handles	  per	  container.	  The	  
simple	  rule	  is,	  the	  more	  containers	  stored	  per	  ground	  slot	  in	  excess	  of	  3.4,	  the	  higher	  
the	  number	  of	  container	  re-­‐handles	  and	  the	  slower	  a	  straddle	  can	  feed	  to	  and	  clear	  
from	  the	  berth	  crane.	  	  	  
4.2.9 	  Scenario	  options	  
Table	  17	  below	  depicts	  the	  normal	  operating	  month	  experience	  by	  POT	  during	  August	  
2010	  reflected	  as	  actual.	  The	  combined	  volumes	  of	  POAL	  and	  POT	  have	  been	  included	  
after	  factoring	  in	  the	  above	  assumptions	  on	  container	  volumes,	  vessel	  numbers,	  berth	  
occupancy	  and	  capabilities,	  timing	  assumptions	  with	  congestion	  ratios,	  and	  wharf	  
activities.	  
TABLE	  17	  –	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  Berth	  Occupancy	  Iteration	  
	  
It	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  added	  congestion	  of	  the	  POAL	  volumes	  will	  drive	  down	  the	  
POT	  shore	  crane	  moves	  per	  hour	  from	  32.8	  to	  28.	  This	  represents	  a	  slow	  down	  of	  
feeding	  the	  shore	  cranes	  by	  4.8	  containers	  per	  crane	  per	  hour	  or	  15%.	  Extrapolated	  
out	  over	  the	  2.3	  cranes	  servicing	  each	  vessel	  is	  a	  total	  slowdown	  of	  11.04	  containers	  
per	  hour.	  If	  this	  was	  further	  extrapolated	  over	  the	  average	  of	  12.5	  hours	  to	  work	  each	  
vessel,	  it	  then	  totals	  138	  containers	  per	  vessel	  or	  13,110	  containers	  over	  the	  95	  vessels	  
serviced	  during	  the	  month.	  
The	  number	  of	  hours	  required	  to	  work	  a	  vessel	  increases	  from	  the	  August	  actual	  
average	  of	  10.75	  to	  12.50.	  This	  is	  1.75	  hours	  extra	  per	  vessel	  or	  an	  increase	  of	  hours	  
worked	  of	  16%	  per	  vessel.	  Over	  a	  month	  this	  is	  166.25	  hours	  or	  1995	  hours	  per	  annum.	  
The	  total	  number	  of	  hours	  that	  a	  vessel	  is	  alongside	  has	  a	  nominal	  increase	  of	  .50	  of	  an	  
hour.	  While	  this	  looks	  small	  in	  isolation,	  it	  also	  adds	  up	  to	  47.5	  hours	  per	  week	  of	  lost	  
sailing	  time	  to	  the	  shipping	  industry.	  This	  would	  equate	  to	  570	  hours	  in	  a	  year.	  To	  put	  
this	  into	  perspective	  it	  is	  23.75	  days	  of	  sailing	  time	  in	  a	  year.	  This	  is	  sufficient	  time	  for	  a	  
vessel	  to	  sail	  from	  New	  Zealand	  to	  China	  and	  halfway	  back	  again.	  (23.75	  days	  @	  US	  
$10,000	  per	  day	  =	  $237,500	  in	  daily	  charges).	  	  
During	  this	  time	  the	  berth	  occupancy	  rate	  would	  increase	  from	  the	  August	  2010	  
average	  of	  38.31%	  to	  a	  robust	  81.90%.	  This	  would	  indicate	  that	  the	  berths	  would	  not	  
NCR Cranes Work,/,Berth
Crane,moves/hr. Per,Vessel ~work,hrs ~berth,hrs No,of,Ships No,of,TEU's Variance Actual possible as,a,%
Actual POT 32.8 2.3 10.75 14.25 46 49,503 3.50 656 1,711 38.31%
7
Combined POT7&7POAL7 28 2.3 12.50 14.75 95 120,956 2.25 1,401 1,711 81.90%
Berth,occupancy,assuming,2.3,berths
AugJ10
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be	  completely	  maxed	  out,	  however	  any	  added	  vessel	  volume	  would	  drive	  further	  
productivity	  losses	  with	  the	  current	  wharf	  support	  structure	  and	  resourcing.	  
It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  POT	  would	  cope	  with	  the	  volume	  increase	  on	  a	  short	  to	  medium	  
term	  basis,	  from	  a	  shipping	  volume,	  berth	  occupancy	  and	  wharf	  activities	  perspective,	  
however	  the	  glaring	  loss	  of	  productivity	  would	  drive	  rapid	  decision	  making	  in	  relation	  
to	  increasing	  the	  available	  ground	  slots	  together	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  initiatives	  to	  
reduce	  the	  average	  container	  dwell	  time	  in	  the	  port.	  
4.3 Rail	  capabilities	  
This	  section	  looks	  at	  the	  rail	  freight	  capabilities	  to	  determine	  if	  rail	  is	  the	  logical	  mode	  
to	  bridge	  the	  POT	  with	  the	  Auckland	  region	  via	  the	  MetroPort,	  situated	  in	  Southdown	  
Auckland.	  This	  will	  be	  a	  critical	  element	  in	  enabling	  the	  supply	  chain	  to	  remain	  
functional	  throughout	  the	  POAL	  outage.	  	  
4.3.1 	  Volumes	  adjusted	  for	  rail	  Imports	  /	  Exports	  	  
The	  combined	  volumes	  to	  be	  handled	  by	  POT	  will	  have	  to	  be	  adjusted	  before	  being	  
applied	  to	  a	  rail	  scenario.	  The	  reasoning	  for	  this	  is	  not	  all	  of	  the	  consolidated	  volume	  
will	  be	  leaving	  POT,	  or	  consigned	  for/from	  the	  Auckland	  region	  as	  the	  POT	  has	  existing	  
services	  with	  a	  widespread	  geographical	  area.	  These	  comprise	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty,	  
Waikato,	  King	  Country	  and	  existing	  Auckland	  volume.	  
	  
TABLE	  18	  -­‐	  Determining	  volume	  to	  be	  railed	  
	  
	  
After	  adjusting	  the	  volumes	  to	  remove	  no	  rail	  cargo,	  the	  remaining	  volume	  to	  be	  
serviced	  by	  rail	  is:	  
• Imports	  =	  34,234	  containers	  
• Exports	  =	  27,814	  containers	  
The	  imbalance	  between	  the	  imports	  and	  exports	  of	  6,420	  containers	  is	  not	  viewed	  as	  
an	  obstacle,	  as	  logic	  dictates	  that	  if	  34,234	  containers	  are	  transported	  from	  POT	  to	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be	  packed	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  as	  exports	  or	  repatriated	  as	  empty	  containers	  to	  
another	  NZ	  port	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  being	  packed	  for	  export.	  This	  factor	  will	  
automatically	  balance	  the	  train	  volume	  north	  and	  south	  bound.	  
4.3.2 	  North	  bound	  trains	  	  
During	  the	  month	  of	  August	  2010,	  KiwiRail	  operated	  an	  average	  of	  2	  dedicated	  
MetroPort	  trains	  per	  day,	  in	  each	  direction,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  POT.	  Each	  train	  has	  
106TEU	  capacity	  which	  at	  the	  time	  was	  the	  optimum	  mix	  per	  MetroPort	  train	  in	  terms	  
of	  handling	  capability	  at	  both	  ends	  where	  the	  train	  is	  loaded	  /	  stripped.	  This	  was	  
sufficient	  to	  clear	  the	  container	  volume	  consigned	  in	  both	  directions.	  	  
Over	  and	  above	  the	  2	  x	  MetroPort	  trains	  per	  day,	  KiwiRail	  operates	  a	  further	  2	  general	  
market	  /	  cargo	  trains	  per	  day	  between	  Southdown,	  Auckland	  and	  POT.	  On	  these	  trains	  
KiwiRail	  offer	  a	  container	  rail	  service	  to	  shipping	  lines	  who	  are	  not	  contracted	  to	  the	  
POT	  to	  use	  the	  dedicated	  MetroPort	  trains	  and	  as	  such	  require	  the	  service	  to	  
repatriate	  empty	  containers	  from	  the	  Auckland	  region	  (ex	  POAL	  arriving	  in	  NZ	  as	  full	  
Imports)	  to	  the	  Tauranga	  region	  to	  allow	  the	  empty	  containers	  to	  be	  used	  for	  packing	  
of	  export	  product.	  Any	  empty	  slots	  on	  these	  trains	  are	  offered	  on	  a	  priority	  basis	  –	  first	  
to	  POT	  and	  then	  to	  the	  open	  market.	  	  
This	  situation	  works	  in	  reverse	  for	  the	  dedicated	  MetroPort	  trains,	  which	  are	  operated	  
by	  KiwiRail	  for	  MetroPort.	  Should	  MetroPort	  have	  any	  empty	  slots	  on	  their	  dedicated	  
trains	  then	  MetroPort	  will	  on	  a	  priority	  basis	  first	  offer	  the	  slots	  to	  KiwiRail	  to	  enable	  
KiwiRail	  the	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  the	  empty	  slots	  to	  their	  customers,	  followed	  by	  
offering	  the	  slots	  to	  the	  open	  market.	  Invariably	  this	  tight	  duopoly	  situation	  results	  in	  
very	  few	  slots	  being	  offered	  direct	  to	  the	  open	  market	  and	  it	  enables	  the	  two	  
operators	  to	  legally	  control	  the	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  container	  rail	  price	  between	  POT	  
–	  Auckland	  –	  POT.	  	  
TABLE	  19	  -­‐	  Trains	  required	  to	  service	  combined	  POAL	  and	  POT	  volumes	  
	  
As	  depicted	  in	  table	  19,	  KiwiRail	  would	  have	  to	  operate	  11	  x	  106TEU	  MetroPort	  trains	  
per	  day	  in	  each	  direction	  to	  clear	  the	  combined	  volumes	  of	  both	  Ports	  of	  34,234	  
containers	  north	  bound	  as	  well	  as	  south	  bound.	  This	  represents	  a	  jump	  from	  the	  
current	  4	  trains	  per	  day	  (2	  x	  MetroPort	  and	  2	  x	  KiwiRail	  General	  Market)	  to	  11	  trains	  
per	  day.	  This	  extrapolates	  out	  to	  75	  trains	  per	  week,	  or	  323	  trains	  per	  month	  or	  3,876	  
trains	  per	  calendar	  year	  in	  each	  direction.	  	  
The	  next	  assessment	  will	  be	  to	  test	  if	  the	  network	  can	  cope	  with	  an	  extra	  7	  trains	  per	  
day	  in	  each	  direction	  or	  a	  total	  of	  an	  extra	  14	  trains	  per	  day	  over	  an	  above	  the	  existing	  
8	  per	  day	  currently	  being	  operated.	  	  	  	  
Volume'per'train Containers
TEU≈/train Volume/'month Per'Month Per'Week Per'Day
106 Current'Maximum'per'network 34,234 323 75 11
115 34,234 298 69 10
120 34,234 285 66 9
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4.3.3 	  South	  bound	  trains	  	  
South	  bound	  trains	  have	  been	  modelled	  from	  Auckland	  to	  POT	  using	  the	  export	  
volume	  of	  27,814	  as	  calculated	  in	  table	  15-­‐volume	  determination.	  Modelling	  south	  
bound	  trains	  is	  not	  going	  to	  contribute	  value,	  due	  to	  the	  natural	  balancing	  discussed	  
under	  4.3.1.	  	  
4.3.4 	  Network	  density	  (Trains	  per	  hour	  on	  network)	  	  
The	  network	  density	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  trains	  that	  can	  
access	  a	  specific	  part	  of	  the	  rail	  infrastructure	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  network	  during	  a	  
specific	  period.	  
The	  network	  in	  question	  is	  the	  line	  from	  MetroPort	  Southdown	  in	  Auckland	  to	  POT,	  
Sulphur	  Point	  Container	  Terminal.	  This	  is	  highlighted	  in	  red	  on	  the	  map	  in	  figure	  10	  
below	  as	  making	  up	  the	  Golden	  Triangle	  rail	  network.	  
The	  maximum	  density	  that	  the	  network	  can	  absorb	  is	  2.7	  trains	  per	  hour	  (Rae,	  2011)	  
with	  current	  passing	  loops	  and	  combination	  of	  double	  and	  single	  tracking.	  	  
During	  August	  2010,	  the	  network	  handled	  1.75	  trains	  per	  hour	  (Rae,	  2011)	  leaving	  a	  
latent	  capacity	  of	  0.95	  trains	  per	  hour	  that	  the	  network	  can	  still	  absorb	  before	  reaching	  
saturation.	  
	  
FIGURE	  9	  -­‐	  Map	  Depicting	  Golden	  Triangle	  Rail	  Network	  (KiwiRail,	  2011)	  
With	  this	  information	  the	  following	  calculations	  can	  be	  made	  as	  depicted	  in	  table	  20	  
below,	  where	  the	  current	  total	  trains	  per	  24-­‐hour	  day	  is	  calculated	  as	  42	  out	  of	  a	  
possible	  65.	  This	  leaves	  23	  slots	  available	  to	  add	  on	  extra	  trains	  per	  24-­‐hour	  day.	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As	  per	  the	  simulation	  done	  in	  4.3.2	  an	  additional	  14	  trains	  per	  day	  (7	  north	  bound	  and	  
7	  south	  bound)	  will	  be	  required	  to	  supplement	  the	  current	  8	  trains	  per	  day	  (4	  x	  north	  
bound	  and	  4	  x	  south	  bound)	  lifting	  the	  total	  number	  of	  MetroPort	  /	  POT	  trains	  per	  day	  
to	  22,	  split	  evenly	  with	  11	  running	  in	  each	  direction.	  
The	  network	  can	  comfortably	  accommodate	  the	  additional	  trains	  without	  exceeding	  
the	  maximum	  sweet	  spot	  of	  2.7	  trains	  per	  hour	  on	  the	  network.	  By	  moving	  the	  density	  
from	  1.75	  to	  2.33	  trains	  per	  hour	  the	  network	  would	  still	  have	  approximately	  14%	  
latent	  capacity	  remaining.	  	  
TABLE	  20	  -­‐	  Network	  Train	  Density	  Calculations	  
	  
4.3.5 Port	  of	  Tauranga	  /	  MetroPort	  train	  stripping	  and	  loading	  ability	  on	  
106	  TEU	  trains	  	  
The	  last	  segment	  in	  the	  proposed	  supply	  chain	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  receiving	  
and	  despatching	  areas	  to	  handle	  the	  new	  volume	  of	  cargo	  onto	  and	  off	  of	  the	  trains.	  
The	  turn	  around	  time	  of	  the	  trains	  will	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  success	  of	  the	  
operation,	  and	  this	  will	  determine	  if	  the	  entire	  workload	  can	  be	  carried	  by	  rail.	  
At	  POT	  Sulphur	  Point	  the	  average	  time	  as	  at	  August	  2010	  to	  strip	  and	  load	  a	  MetroPort	  
train	  was	  4	  hours.	  The	  Port	  believe	  that	  this	  time	  could	  be	  improved	  on	  to	  an	  average	  
of	  3	  hours	  (McColgan,	  2012)	  as	  this	  reduced	  time	  had	  been	  achieved	  with	  stripping	  
and	  loading	  of	  full	  trains	  previously.	  
At	  MetroPort	  the	  average	  time,	  during	  the	  same	  period	  to	  strip	  and	  load	  a	  train	  was	  3	  
hours.	  MetroPort	  are	  comfortable	  that	  this	  can	  be	  done	  at	  an	  average	  time	  of	  2½	  
hours	  as	  this	  has	  been	  achieved	  in	  the	  past.	  
TABLE	  21	  -­‐	  POT	  /	  MetroPort	  Train	  Turn	  Around	  Time	  
	  
Per$hour Per$24$hr$day Per$Week Per$Month
Capacity 2.70 65 454 1,966
Actual 1.75 42 294 1,274
Available$ 0.95 23 160 692
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Using	  the	  existing	  times	  and	  applying	  the	  new	  train	  volumes	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  POT	  
would	  require	  33	  hours	  to	  strip	  and	  load	  11	  trains.	  The	  requirement	  is	  for	  this	  task	  to	  
be	  performed	  within	  a	  24-­‐hour	  period.	  POT	  would	  have	  to	  shave	  9	  hours	  off	  of	  the	  task	  
and	  reduce	  the	  average	  time	  to	  strip	  and	  load	  a	  train	  from	  3	  hours	  to	  2	  hours.	  The	  2-­‐
hour	  time	  per	  train	  will	  allow	  for	  an	  extra	  ~11	  minutes	  contingency	  (extra)	  per	  train	  as	  
a	  buffer	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  time	  is	  required	  for	  unplanned	  events.	  This	  represents	  a	  
33%	  improvement	  required	  per	  train	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  new	  volume	  of	  11	  trains	  per	  day	  
to	  be	  processed.	  
The	  situation	  is	  slightly	  less	  frenetic	  at	  MetroPort	  where	  27.5	  hours	  would	  be	  required	  
to	  perform	  the	  same	  task.	  MetroPort’s	  2.50	  hours	  to	  strip	  and	  load	  a	  train	  would	  have	  
to	  reduce	  by	  ½	  and	  hour	  per	  train	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  11	  trains	  per	  day	  to	  be	  processed.	  
This	  would	  require	  a	  total	  reduction	  of	  3½	  hours	  over	  the	  24-­‐hour	  period.	  This	  
represents	  a	  25%	  improvement	  required	  per	  train	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  new	  volume	  of	  11	  
trains	  to	  be	  processed	  every	  day.	  The	  2	  hour	  time	  limit	  per	  train	  would	  also	  include	  the	  
same	  extra	  ~11	  minute	  contingency	  per	  train	  in	  the	  event	  of	  unplanned	  delays.	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5 CONCLUSION	  /	  OUTCOME	  
Currently	  the	  POAL	  has	  experienced	  8	  closures	  during	  the	  last	  two	  and	  a	  half	  months	  
(December	  2011	  to	  20	  February	  2012).	  These	  closures	  have	  been	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
industrial	  action.	  More	  industrial	  action	  is	  planned	  with	  the	  next	  closure	  starting	  on	  
Friday	  24th	  February	  2012	  and	  due	  to	  continue	  for	  a	  period	  of	  three	  consecutive	  weeks,	  
up	  to	  Friday	  16th	  March	  2012.	  	  
The	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  export	  supply	  chain	  should	  not	  be	  
underestimated.	  A	  supply	  chain	  is	  only	  as	  robust	  as	  its	  weakest	  link.	  These	  links	  in	  the	  
supply	  chain	  are	  constantly	  subjected	  to	  varying	  weather	  phenomenon,	  natural	  
disasters	  such	  as	  earthquakes	  or	  tsunamis	  and	  man	  made	  disasters	  such	  as	  pollution,	  
industrial	  action,	  or	  financial	  crisis.	  
This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  greater	  Auckland	  supply	  chain	  is	  real.	  In	  this	  
instance	  the	  industry	  has	  always	  had	  two	  weeks	  notice	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  industrial	  
action	  resulting	  in	  POAL’s	  closure.	  In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster,	  industry	  will	  not	  
enjoy	  this	  luxury	  of	  two	  weeks	  to	  implement	  contingency	  planning.	  	  	  
During	  this	  period	  the	  POT	  has	  risen	  to	  the	  occasion	  and	  handled	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
import	  volumes	  and	  vessels	  turned	  away	  from	  POAL.	  While	  the	  supply	  chain	  is	  still	  
working,	  albeit	  much	  slower	  than	  normal,	  it	  is	  clear	  the	  POT	  and	  KiwiRail	  would	  need	  
more	  time	  to	  prepare,	  plan	  and	  ramp	  up	  services	  to	  cope	  with	  this	  type	  of	  volume	  on	  
an	  on-­‐going	  basis.	  
The	  weak	  links	  discovered	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  during	  this	  simulation	  are:	  
• Space	  constraints	  (shortage	  of	  developed	  ground	  slots)	  at	  POT	  and	  MetroPort.	  This	  
drives	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  stacking	  and	  storage	  of	  containers,	  with	  the	  resultant	  
slowing	  down	  of	  the	  shore	  operations	  due	  to	  congestion.	  The	  flow-­‐on	  effect	  is	  
double	  and	  triple	  handling	  of	  containers.	  POT	  and	  MetroPort	  have	  space	  available	  
and	  they	  are	  racing	  ahead	  with	  the	  development	  of	  more	  ground	  slots,	  however	  
this	  development	  takes	  time	  and	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  a	  systematic	  ramp	  up	  as	  
opposed	  to	  doubling	  overnight.	  	  
• A	  shortage	  of	  straddle	  cranes	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  extra	  volume	  at	  such	  short	  notice.	  
POT	  have	  ordered	  a	  further	  six	  new	  straddle	  cranes	  as	  part	  of	  their	  growth	  plan.	  
These	  straddles	  are	  still	  some	  months	  away.	  Consideration	  should	  have	  been	  given	  
to	  relocating	  straddle	  cranes	  from	  POAL	  to	  POT	  to	  assist	  with	  the	  extra	  volumes	  
during	  this	  period.	  
• Insufficient	  available	  infrastructure	  to	  handle	  sustainable	  rail	  exchange	  at	  POT.	  In	  
response	  to	  this,	  POT	  have	  sought	  board	  approval	  to	  increase	  the	  rail	  spurs	  as	  well	  
as	  tar	  sealing	  between	  the	  spurs	  to	  allow	  access	  for	  multiple	  rake	  loading,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  loading	  one	  rake	  at	  a	  time.	  The	  POT	  has	  also	  taken	  delivery	  of	  a	  reach	  
stacker,	  which	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  reach	  over	  one	  loaded	  rake	  to	  load	  a	  second	  rake.	  	  	  	  
• Lack	  of	  available	  trained	  human	  resources.	  This	  is	  a	  fundamental	  challenge,	  as	  
without	  the	  required	  resources,	  all	  the	  new	  machinery	  will	  stand	  idle.	  It	  takes	  time	  
and	  spare	  equipment	  to	  recruit	  and	  train	  resources.	  While	  this	  recruitment	  is	  now	  
underway,	  the	  benefits	  of	  this	  will	  be	  downstream.	  In	  the	  interim	  the	  existing	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resources	  are	  being	  overworked,	  which	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  sustainable	  situation.	  This	  
is	  an	  issue	  for	  both	  the	  POT	  as	  well	  as	  KiwiRail.	  
• Potential	  rail	  network	  saturation.	  KiwiRail	  have	  the	  locomotives	  and	  the	  wagon	  
fleet	  to	  implement	  the	  required	  number	  of	  trains	  per	  day.	  The	  simulation	  works	  on	  
the	  network,	  however	  this	  will	  drive	  the	  network	  close	  to	  capacity	  with	  the	  
resultant	  decrease	  in	  time	  available	  to	  close	  the	  network	  for	  the	  required	  on-­‐going	  
maintenance,	  or	  to	  cope	  with	  any	  operational	  issues	  such	  as	  breakdowns	  or	  
derailments.	  
Logisticians	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  other	  countries,	  constantly	  perform	  a	  
juggling	  act	  to	  keep	  supply	  chains	  flexible,	  alive	  and	  working.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  task	  
and	  takes	  years	  of	  experience,	  an	  in-­‐depth	  industry	  knowledge	  and	  enduring	  supply	  
chain	  failure	  or	  collapse,	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  navigate	  the	  fluid	  global	  supply	  and	  
distribution	  streams.	  	  
A	  key	  link	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  supply	  chain	  is	  international	  shipping	  companies	  or	  lines.	  
The	  majority	  of	  these	  lines	  are	  subject	  to	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  northern	  hemisphere	  
and	  while	  they	  maintain	  offices	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  they	  have	  very	  little	  or	  no	  decision	  
making	  authority.	  They	  are	  driven	  by	  commercial	  reality	  and	  business	  seasonality’s	  and	  
will	  not	  hesitate	  to	  unilaterally	  change	  services.	  Exporters	  and	  importers	  in	  New	  
Zealand	  have	  very	  little	  influence	  over	  this	  situation.	  	  
The	  POT	  will	  have	  to	  do	  some	  work	  on	  the	  loading	  and	  stripping	  of	  MetroPort	  trains,	  as	  
this	  is	  a	  potential	  area	  where	  the	  supply	  chain	  could	  hesitate	  and	  become	  blocked.	  If	  a	  
backlog	  were	  allowed	  to	  build	  up,	  the	  only	  resolution	  would	  be	  to	  bring	  road	  bridging	  
in	  to	  relieve	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  operations.	  This	  in	  turn	  would	  probably	  manifest	  itself	  
as	  a	  backlog	  in	  another	  area,	  as	  suddenly	  the	  POT	  would	  have	  to	  handle	  the	  extra	  
volume	  of	  trucks,	  while	  continuing	  normal	  operations.	  There	  would	  be	  no	  margin	  for	  
error	  in	  the	  system,	  making	  the	  supply	  chain	  that	  much	  more	  fragile	  or	  prone	  to	  fail.	  	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  why	  trucking	  plays	  such	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  logistics	  scene.	  
The	  supply	  chain	  is	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  the	  trucking	  industry,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  
industry	  in	  New	  Zealand	  is	  vocally	  advocating	  rail	  as	  a	  future	  option	  or	  link	  in	  the	  
supply	  chain.	  A	  level	  of	  discomfort	  exists	  within	  industry	  regarding	  the	  monopoly	  
situation	  currently	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  trucking	  industry.	  
No	  amount	  of	  risk	  planning	  will	  make	  a	  supply	  chain	  untouchable,	  however	  risk	  
planning	  does	  allow	  for	  a	  quick	  recovery,	  as	  most	  of	  the	  options	  are	  explored	  as	  part	  of	  
a	  risk/crisis	  plan	  and	  can	  be	  adapted	  to	  suit	  in	  times	  of	  crisis	  management.	  
Over	  time,	  supply	  chains	  have	  evolved	  from	  a	  stock	  situation	  to	  a	  just	  in	  time	  supply	  
basis	  driven	  by	  a	  plethora	  of	  reasons,	  with	  the	  common	  denominator,	  or	  most	  
important	  consideration,	  being	  the	  reduction	  of	  working	  capital	  employed	  in	  the	  
supply	  chain.	  This	  has	  effectively	  reduced	  the	  safety	  margins	  that	  businesses	  have	  
traditionally	  operated	  with,	  in	  terms	  of	  stock	  levels	  or	  time	  to	  market.	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  a	  Trans	  Tasman	  supply	  chain,	  where	  the	  consignee	  holds	  
one	  week’s	  safety	  stock	  in	  Australia,	  as	  the	  supply	  chain	  is	  one	  week	  from	  the	  source,	  
being	  New	  Zealand	  (there	  are	  three	  weekly	  sailings	  from	  New	  Zealand	  to	  Australia).	  In	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the	  event	  of	  severe	  weather	  on	  the	  Tasman,	  which	  can	  delay	  a	  vessel	  by	  up	  to	  six	  days,	  
or	  a	  port	  closure	  in	  Australia	  due	  to	  industrial	  action,	  the	  supply	  chain	  is	  severely	  
exposed	  to	  risk	  and	  will	  potentially	  run	  out.	  Part	  of	  risk	  planning	  should	  include	  
modelling	  of	  minimum	  stock	  holdings	  as	  a	  safety	  net	  for	  such	  events.	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  when	  the	  POAL	  and	  POT	  import	  /	  export	  container	  
volumes	  are	  grouped	  together,	  they	  come	  close	  to	  balancing	  each	  other	  out.	  This	  is	  a	  
factor	  worth	  further	  investigation	  and	  could	  possibly	  take	  cost	  out	  for	  Port	  companies	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  importers	  and	  exporters.	  It	  would	  involve	  closer	  collaboration	  between	  
the	  Ports,	  which	  is	  unlikely	  as	  they	  compete	  directly	  with	  one	  another.	  
The	  relevance	  of	  this	  study	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  current	  situation	  where	  POAL	  has	  
been	  sporadically	  closed	  for	  extended	  periods	  due	  to	  industrial	  action.	  	  While	  the	  
contingency	  supply	  chain	  via	  POT	  to	  MetroPort	  has	  handled	  this	  situation	  with	  a	  fair	  
degree	  of	  aplomb,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  POT	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  sustain	  the	  current	  level	  
of	  volume	  that	  this	  situation	  has	  forced	  on	  to	  them.	  	  This	  highlights	  that	  the	  POAL	  is	  a	  
crucial	  link	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  supply	  chain,	  as	  is	  the	  POT.	  	  New	  Zealand	  Inc.	  would	  
benefit	  from	  further	  modelling	  including	  the	  reverse	  situation	  where	  POT	  closes	  and	  
POAL	  has	  to	  form	  part	  of	  the	  contingency	  plan.
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7 APPENDICES	  
	  
7.1 New	  Zealand	  North	  Island	  map	  with	  container	  ports	  and	  actual	  TEU≈	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7.2 New	  Zealand	  South	  Island	  map	  with	  container	  ports	  and	  actual	  TEU≈	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6 ANL"BINDANA TRG 1
7 ANL"BINDANA AKL






14 BUXLINK TRG 1
15 BUXLINK AKL
16 CALIFORNIA"MERCURY TRG 1
17 CALIFORNIA"MERCURY AKL
18 CAP"BEATRICE AKL




23 CAP"BYRON TRG 1
24 CAP"BYRON AKL
25 CAP"CAPRICORN AKL
26 CAP"CLEVELAND TRG 1
27 CAP"CLEVELAND AKL
28 CAP"MANUEL TRG 1
29 CAP"MANUEL AKL
30 CAPITAINE"WALLIS TRG








39 HS"WAGNER TRG 1
40 HS"WAGNER AKL
41 ITAJAI"EXPRESS TRG




46 KOTA"PEKARANG TRG 1
47 KOTA"PEKARANG AKL























71 OCEAN"BRIGHT TRG 1
72 OCEAN"BRIGHT AKL
73 OOCL"MELBOURNE TRG 1
74 OOCL"MELBOURNE AKL
75 PARANAGUA"EXPRESS TRG 1
76 PARANAGUA"EXPRESS AKL
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7.4 Proforma	  berth	  booking	  schedule	  from	  Port	  of	  Tauranga	  with	  
modelling	  of	  POAL	  and	  POT	  vessels	  with	  a	  resultant	  2.3	  berths	  used	  on	  
average.	  
	  
Source	  McColgan	  M.	  (2011)	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7.11 Map	  of	  New	  Zealand	  North	  Island	  Rail	  Network	  with	  Golden	  Triangle	  
highlighted	  on	  the	  map	  in	  Red.	  (Map	  supplied	  by	  KiwiRail	  and	  






	   62	  
7.12 Golden	  Triangle	  Road	  Route	  Network	  with	  three	  main	  options	  
highlighted.	  (Wises	  Maps,	  December	  2011	  with	  Apple	  Pixelmator	  
overlay	  to	  include	  all	  three	  routes	  on	  the	  one	  map.)	  
	  
	  
